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INTRODUCTION: THE FAIRY TALE OF DISABILITY PROTECTION
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
has forced people with disabilities into a Goldilocks dilemma—they are either too
disabled or not disabled enough. And thus far, very few have been “disabled ‘just
right.’”1 This Goldilocks dilemma is an apt analogy for the predicament facing
disabled individuals. By consistently narrowing the meaning of disability, federal
courts—and especially the U.S. Supreme Court—have weakened the ADA by severely
constricting the scope of who qualifies for its protection.2
Concern over the ADA is timely. In September of 2006, bipartisan legislation based
on the National Council on Disability’s recommendations was introduced in the House
of Representatives.3 Entitled the ADA Restoration Act of 2006, the bill failed to make

∗ Associate, Jenner & Block; J.D. 2005, University of Texas. I am indebted to Wendy
Wagner for her support with this project. Nancy Levit was also an encouragement. Many thanks
to Robert Burgdorf, Michael Heidler, Sharona Hoffman, Paul Secunda, Michael Stein, and
Michael Waterstone for their comments. All glory to Jesus Christ.
1. Ruth O’Brien, Defining Moments: (Dis)ability, Individuality, and Normalcy, in VOICES
FROM THE EDGE: NARRATIVES A BOUT THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 41 (Ruth O’Brien
ed., 2004) (citing Charles Lindner, Supreme Court Upsetting a Rights Movement: The Supreme
Court’s ADA Employment Rulings Read as If They Were Drawn from the Pages of Catch 22,
L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at M2). Aviam Soifer has used the Goldilocks metaphor to illustrate
the Supreme Court’s tendency to second-guess the amount of Congressional findings required to
support legislation guaranteeing constitutional rights through the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 712–13
(2002).
2. Albert R. Hunt, More Attention for Disabilities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at A11. In
particular, the Supreme Court has articulated an extremely cautionary approach when it comes
to assessing who should qualify for protection against discrimination in employment under the
ADA. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 49 (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 511
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 6258, 109th Cong.
(2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6258.
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any progress before the session ended and the bill was cleared from the books.4 A new
Congress, however, provides renewed hope for the passage of such a bill.5 Indeed, on
July 26, 2007, Congress introduced a nearly identical version of the legislation
proposed last fall: the ADA Restoration Act of 2007 (“ADA Restoration Act”).6
The ADA Restoration Act, among other things, would simplify the definition of
disability under the ADA.7 As will be explained, the present definition of disability is
narrowly construed and often results in judges focusing on the threshold question of
whether someone actually has a disability—even to the exclusion of considering an
employer’s motives.8 The ADA Restoration Act would also expand the scope of
disability significantly by legislating rules of construction.9 Such changes evince the
plain meaning of disability the framers of the ADA intended—a broad interpretation
that takes into account the social meaning of disability.10
Much of the controversy over the ADA has centered on how to define disability.
The answer to this question is critical, as it determines who enjoys the statute’s
protection and who does not.11 This focus has been pronounced for the protection the
ADA provides in the context of employment under Title I. Title I mandates that “no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual” with regard to any aspect of
employment.12 This is the title under which the ADA’s protection has been heavily
diluted and the part of the ADA on which this Article will focus.13

4. Id.
5. This is not to say that such a bill will likely pass. Rather, it is simply more likely to pass
in the current Congress than before—especially given that the “[new] Democratic leadership is
very pro-ADA.” Sam Bagenstos, Disability Law, http://disabilitylaw.blogspot.com/
2006_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 13, 2006, 9:29 CDT). Bagenstos rightly cautions that any
attempt to redefine disability will almost certainly engender staunch opposition. Id.
6. ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3195.
7. See generally id.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. H.R. 3195 §§ 4(2)(B), 7.
10. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 11, 102 (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf [hereinafter RIGHTING
THE ADA] (asserting its recommendation would refocus the ADA on prohibiting disability
discrimination and incorporate a “social model” of disability); see also infra Part I.A.
(explaining the social model of disability).
11. The requirements to bring a lawsuit under Title I of the ADA are discussed in detail in
Part I.C.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
13. The other main protective categories under the ADA are Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–
12165 (2000), which prohibits discrimination by public entities, and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§
12181–12189 (2000), which proscribes discrimination in public accommodations and services
provided by private entities. Concerns about who qualifies as disabled have been less
pronounced for Titles II and III of the ADA. See generally Michael Waterstone, The Untold
Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (2005)
(exploring how Titles II and III of the ADA have fared much more favorably than Title I). In
particular, the individualized inquiry is much less rigorous. For example, “[u]nder Title II,
someone may sue for discrimination because she could have benefited from a state or local
government’s service.” O’Brien, supra note 1, at 41. This lower threshold for standing in Titles
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This Article explains how, amidst all that has informed and is informing a cultural
view of disability, there is a single predominating paradigm—the medical model of
disability.14 Despite the general trend toward social constructionist accounts of
identity, and in particular, the shift to a social model of disability among activists and
academics,15 society seems to have retained a medical paradigm for understanding
disability. Perhaps this is due to the fact that disability and its theoretical
underpinnings have not received the same degree of scrutiny as other aspects of
identity, such as race or gender.16 These underpinnings—and especially how they are
manifested in media representations of disability—are critical and affect both the
public and judicial perception of disability.17
Unlike scholarship that has only mentioned the medical model of disability in
passing,18 Part I documents how it remains firmly ensconced in our culture’s collective
consciousness. The ADA represented a symbolic victory for making the transition to a

II and III of the ADA helps explain how suits brought under these titles have been relatively
successful when compared with those brought under Title I. Significantly, between eighty and
ninety percent of all suits brought under Title I have been decided in the employer’s favor. Id. at
18–19.
14. See infra Part I.A. (explaining the medical model of disability).
15. Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver & Len Barton, Introduction, in DISABILITY STUDIES TODAY
1–8 (Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver & Len Barton eds., 2002) (explaining the academic shift to an
emphasis on disability as a sociological field).
16. See also Gary L. Albrecht, American Pragmatism and Disability Studies, in DISABILITY
STUDIES TODAY, supra note 15, at 32 (explaining how, in the United States, the “emphasis on
rugged individualism, capitalism and the American brand of democracy” shapes an
individualized model of disability).
17. PAUL T. JAEGER & CYNTHIA ANN BOWMAN, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: INCLUSION,
ACCESS, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 100 (2005) (examining the influence the media’s
portrayal of disability has on public perception); CHARLES A. RILEY II, DISABILITY AND THE
MEDIA: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE xiv (2005) (same). Additionally, Richard Scotch, Professor
of Sociology at the University of Texas of Dallas, has observed:
[I]f the marginalization of people with disabilities is the result of social processes
that are embedded in our culture, then it is not surprising that governmental and
legal institutions as well have employed a traditional medical model of disability
based on incapacity that focuses on the limitations of plaintiffs with disabilities in
their application of the ADA. Public officials and the courts frequently mirror
well-established limiting assumptions about people with disabilities. The statute's
broad definitions of who has a legitimate disability, what constitutes
discrimination on the basis of disability, and what remedies are appropriate in
countering such discrimination may be at odds with popular understandings of
who should be treated as “truly” disabled, what their problems are, and what
protections they deserve from regulators and the courts.
Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 218 (2000) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also RIGHTING THE
ADA, supra note 10, at 40 (explaining that the media and courts’ mischaracterizations “have fed
on one another” to frustrate the ADA’s goals).
18. MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE &
THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 237 (2003); RILEY, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that
“examples of the medical model persistently dominate the mainstream press”); Mary Crossley,
The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 653 (1999).
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social view of disability, but the ongoing public representations of disability and
federal courts’ treatment of disability have told a different story.19
Part I.A briefly explicates the two dominant models for understanding disability—
the medical and social models of disability.20 Part I.B then examines a few key cultural
examples of the present and ongoing entrenchment of the medical model of disability:
Million Dollar Baby and Clint Eastwood’s legal battle with the ADA, Christopher
Reeve, and the Jerry Lewis Telethon. Though influential in shaping a contemporary
understanding of disability, these representations have not received much examination
by legal scholars.21 There have been many consequences to the dominance of the
medical paradigm in popular culture, but perhaps most significantly, it has simply
misled the public and judiciary about what it means for someone to have a disability.
Part I.C tracks the medical model’s entrenchment in federal court decisions
addressing the ADA. There has been little discussion among legal scholars of how the
dilemmas emerging from federal court decisions under Title I of the ADA appear to
stem from a “medicalized” understanding of disability.22 This Section argues that the
cultural persistence of the medical paradigm has mediated an ongoing focus on the
definitional bounds of disability and created a Goldilocks dilemma: ADA claimants
often are found either “not disabled enough” to warrant the protections of the ADA or
“too disabled” to be a “qualified individual” for the respective job.23 Finally, this
Section provides an analysis of how even the most recent federal court decisions
continue to perpetuate the Goldilocks dilemma.
Part II of this Article argues that Congress should pass an ADA restoration act
similar to the one that is currently pending in the legislature. Such an Act would
overhaul the ADA and provide a workable solution that could reshape
misunderstandings and stereotypes concerning both the ADA and disability in general.
Finally, this Part recommends that the EEOC compile reports to document systemic

19. See infra Part I.
20. Although there are many theoretical models for apprehending disability, these two have
been the most pronounced in academic literature.
21. Mary Johnson (and her book Make Them Go Away, supra note 18) is a striking
exception. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (crediting Make Them Go Away with
furthering the conversation about disability and the media).
22. Some have examined a few Supreme Court decisions from this vantage point. Crossley,
supra note 18, at 710 (noting how federal courts addressing impairment employ a medicalized
understanding of “impairment”); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars:
Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175,
1191, 1195, 1217–18, 1224–25 (2002) (noting that four recent Supreme Court decisions
represent the “Court’s return to a narrower, biomedical model of disability”); Laura L. Rovner,
Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1076–81 (2004) (examining how in
Alabama v. Garrett the Supreme Court viewed the plaintiffs’ claims through the lens of the
medical model of disability). These examinations have been brief and almost exclusively
focused on Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different
Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 608 (2004)
(explaining that the canonical treatment of ADA accommodations views the source of cost as
arising from “the endogenous, inherent inability of the disabled, rather than through the
exogenous, constructed social environment”).
23. This dilemma has been recognized by scholars as a “catch-22” under the ADA. See,
e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 413, 448 (1991).
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disability discrimination toward certain groups. Such reports could educate the public
and judiciary as to certain disabled groups that have experienced extreme and ongoing
discrimination.24
I. THE ONGOING ENTRENCHMENT OF THE MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
During the last two decades, a growing body of scholarship has emerged that
focuses on the philosophical nature of disability.25 This body of literature has fit under
the guise of “disability studies” and has examined the evolving views of disability.
More recently, this work has crossed into the legal arena, providing legal scholars a
conceptually helpful foundation for understanding the social dynamics of what it
means to be disabled.26 This Section will briefly focus on the two most basic theories
for understanding disability: the medical model of disability and the social model of
disability.27 Understanding these conceptual paradigms for disability is critical for
apprehending the current interpretive flaws, and promise, of the ADA.
A. The Medical and Social Models of Disability
The medical model of disability has been the dominant paradigm of disability in
America.28 This model does not so much reference an intellectual position advanced
by contemporary scholars as it provides a way of describing the norms that have
traditionally governed disability in Western society. As such, it relies on normative
categories of “disabled” and “non-disabled,”29 and presumes that a person’s disability

24. Though it is unlikely that much of the public would read these reports, it is likely that
they would be written about and presented by attorneys to the judiciary. Over time, the content
of such reports could “trickle down” to the public as certain findings in these reports slowly
become more widespread and mainstream.
25. See, e.g., DISABILITY STUDIES TODAY, supra note 15; MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS
OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990); THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2006).
26. Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 861, 875 (2004) (citing, e.g., Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000); Paula E. Berg,
Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in
Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1999)).
27. A U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ report, authored by Christopher Bell and Robert
Burgdorf, aptly set out these two divergent views—even before the ADA passed:
There are two common views with distinctly divergent assumptions and
approaches to the problem of handicap discrimination. Many people see handicaps
as strictly physical or mental disorders that limit ability. . . . The competing view
emphasizes that societal actions and prejudice restrict opportunities for people
with mental and physical limitations[.]
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 86
(1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM ].
28. Crossley, supra note 26, at 876; Scotch, supra note 17, at 218 (“For over a hundred
years, disability has been defined in predominantly medical terms as a chronic functional
incapacity whose consequence was functional limitations assumed to result from physical or
mental impairment.”).
29. Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the
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is “a personal, medical problem, requiring but an individualized medical solution; that
people who have disabilities face no ‘group’ problem caused by society or that social
policy should be used to ameliorate.”30 The medical model views the physiological
condition itself as the problem.31 In other words, “the individual is the locus of
disability.”32 Even those with disabilities have sometimes adopted this view.33
Understood simply as a biological trait, disability leaves the individual in need of
physiological assistance to remediate the effects of the disability.34 Under the medical
model, people with disabilities are often characterized as having individual attributes
of incapacity and dependence.35 Accordingly, given the view of disability as an
individual problem, appropriate assistance is understood either as rehabilitation efforts
to enable the individual to overcome the effects of the disability, or medical efforts to
find a cure for the individual.36 Either way, the focus is on the individual and how she
can overcome her condition.37 In the context of accommodations under the ADA,
adherence to the notion of disability as biological inability is precisely what enables
the conclusion that accommodations push the market’s balance beyond equilibrium.38
More generally, adherence to the medical model encourages the view that disability
rights are “special,” akin to some form of charity for biological losers.39 In short, under
the medical model, a person’s disability is her own personal misfortune—devoid of
social cause or responsibility.40 From this perspective, the medical model has the
Copy-And-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 597 (2002). These categories create a binary
distinction that has fueled the Goldilocks dilemma discussed in Part I.C.
30. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 27; see also Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 595 (explaining
that under the medical model of disability, disability is apprehended as a measurable, biological
fact or an inherently individual defect).
31. See JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 13−14 (observing that the eugenics
movement is the quintessential medical model approach to disability).
32. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 61; Crossley, supra note 18, at 649; Eichhorn, supra note
29, at 596; see also JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 14 (noting this perspective interprets
the individual with the disability as the problem).
33. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussion of Christopher Reeve).
34. Crossley, supra note 26, at 876.
35. Rovner, supra note 22, at 1044.
36. Crossley, supra note 26, at 876; Stein, supra note 22, at 607. “Thus, the medical model
often obliged people with disabilities to make heroic physical efforts to look and act like
nondisabled people.” Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 595–96.
37. Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 595. Part of the downfall of this expectation is that not all
disabilities hold the promise or possibility of a cure and/or remediation. In addition, if a disabled
individual is to spend her time seeking a cure, this may trade off with efforts to achieve help for
her present condition—such as in the form of reasonable accommodations. Finally, the
viewpoint that a disabled person must seek to overcome her disability is quite convenient
because if one believes that the only thing that will truly help a disabled person is a “cure,” and
the cure does not exist or has not been found, then that person would appear not to have any
further responsibility. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 231.
38. Stein, supra note 22, at 598. Stein calls this approach the “canonical perspective” for
accommodation costs. Id.
39. See id. at 607 (noting that the perspective of disability rights as “special” fits squarely
with the medical model of disability).
40. Crossley, supra note 26, at 876; Scotch, supra note 17, at 219 (“By focusing on
adaptations required from people with disabilities, the medical model implies far less from
employers or other social gatekeepers in terms of accommodation since the environment is taken

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=980177

2008]

WHEN DISABILITY ISN’T “JUST RIGHT”

187

capacity to fragment the disability community by stressing the individual physiological
traits that differentiate disabled persons, rather than the common societal obstacles that
unite them.41
Under the medical model, people with disabilities are often typecast into one of two
roles: the “pitiable poster child” or the “inspirational ‘supercrip.’”42 Under the
“pitiable poster child” role, disabled individuals are seen as objects of pity—childlike
and in need of charity.43 Think Jerry Lewis Telethon. This image of the “cute and
courageous” poster child, smiling despite her cruel fate, is a “most beloved American
symbol of disability.”44 The contrasting, alternate role to the poster child is the
“supercrip.” If a disabled person is unable to assume a cute and childlike role in
society, the expectation is for that person to be a supercrip and “overcome” her
disability through her own courageous efforts.45 A supercrip is a disabled person—
usually likeable—who has a heroic story of attempting to overcome her disability.46
Christopher Reeve is the archetypal example. The disability rights movement has
spurned such characterizations and sought “to put an ordinary face—not that of a
victim, a hero, or a martyr—on people with disabilities.”47 The cultural entrenchment
of these characterizations and roles will be discussed in more detail in the Section
below.48
as given.”). One disability scholar has put it this way: “With the medical lens fixed on the
individual and his or her disability, the larger political, economic, and material forces at play in
an able-ist society fall somewhere outside the frame.” Linda Ware, Writing, Identity, and the
Other: Dare We Do Disability Studies?, 52 J. T CHR. EDUC. 107, 107 (2001).
41. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 13 (2003) (quoting Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans:
The Foundation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181
(Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987)). This is important since the disability rights movement
has historically had difficulty organizing as “people with disabilities shared no common social
position and had little reasons to interact with each other socially.” RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 109 (2001).
42. Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 330 (2000). Professor Riley has similarly observed that the
traditional emphasis on the physical aspect of disability renders “the ‘sadcrip-supercrip’ as two
sides of the same coin—one is dependent on caregivers while the other is a miraculous triumph
of medical progress teamed with willpower.” RILEY, supra note 17, at 3−4. (In Riley’s
explanation, the “pitiable poster child” is the “sadcrip.”). Riley also observes the tendency in the
media to drift toward one of these two polarities: over-dramatized stories of either the
“supercrip” or the “patient” (“sadcrip”). Id. at 51. Accordingly, the Easter Seals, a disability
organization, has urged writers to tell “more fully integrated” stories of people with disabilities.
Id. Such stories chronicle “people living ordinary lives, working and playing side by side with
others, ‘experiencing the same pain/pleasures that others derive.’” Id.
43. Stein, supra note 42, at 330.
44. Id.; JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (1993) (“The poster child . . . [n]o other symbol of disability is more
beloved by Americans than the cute and courageous poster child—or more loathed by people
with disabilities themselves.”).
45. Stein, supra note 42, at 330; see also RILEY, supra note 17, at 27 (observing that the
disability memoir “is all second act—its very premise is the triumph of recovery and forward
motion”).
46. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 41.
47. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 2.
48. See infra Part I.B.2.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=980177

188

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 83:181

Juxtaposed with the medical model of disability is the social model. Given the
expanse of its supporters, no one restatement of the social model will cover every
interpretation.49 In short, under this model, disability is redefined as a social
construct—a type of multi-faceted societal oppression—and distinguished from the
physiological notion of impairment.50 In this context, being “disabled” depends upon
deviation from society’s construction of corporeal normality.51 Moreover, the
experience of being a disabled person consists largely of encounters with the many
barriers erected by society—physical, institutional, and attitudinal—that inhibit full
participation in mainstream life.52 One upshot of the social model is that the

49. Adam Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251,
1257 (2007).
50. See generally Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY
STUDIES READER, supra note 25, at 197.
51. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 7; see Crossley, supra note 18, at 649 (explaining how the
concept of being a “normal human being” is socially constructed and therefore culturally
relative); Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 102–09 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) (arguing the categories of “normal” and
“abnormal” are not parts of the biological world, but instead, based on social myth). See
generally LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY
(1995) (arguing that to understand the construction of disability one must understand the
emergence and construction of normalcy). The consequence of this insight is that the very
meaning of disability will vary from one culture to the next. A number of authors have provided
excellent cross-cultural scholarship on disability, in which they assess the variation of the
meaning of disability from one culture and/or country to the next.
52. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 74 (Anita Silvers, David Wasserman
7 Mary B. Mahowald eds., 1998); Crossley, supra note 26, at 876–77. Crossley explains this
dynamic in the following way:
A person who cannot walk may certainly experience the “natural” disadvantages
associated with this inability as a loss, but more limiting is the inability to enter
public buildings accessed exclusively by stairs, to use public transportation that is
inaccessible, or to frequent sites with narrow restroom stalls. Similarly, a person
who becomes deaf may mourn the loss of listening to music or hearing laughter,
but is likely to suffer far graver injury from society’s near universal adoption of
telephonic communication systems that exclude him from participation in
employment and social life. In this view, the primary harms experienced by
persons with disabilities are the product of social expectations and arrangements
and conventional methods of physical construction.
Id. at 877. This point helps explain how one could argue that disability discrimination is always
the result of an environmental barrier—and not due to the actual impairment. For example, when
an employer makes the decision not to hire a qualified person because of his diagnosis of bipolar
disorder, the discrimination is happening not because of his mood disorder, but because of an
attitudinal barrier that the person making the hiring decision possesses and is choosing to act
upon. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, DEFINING “DISABILITY” IN A CIVIL RIGHTS CONTEXT: THE
COURTS’ FOCUS ON EXTENT OF LIMITATIONS AS OPPOSED TO FAIR TREATMENT AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY, NO. 6 POL’Y BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA 25 (2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/extentoflimitations.pdf. [hereinafter DEFINING
DISABILITY]; see also Rovner, supra note 22, at 1044 (articulating “attitudinal, architectural,
sensory, cognitive and economic barriers”).
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experience of disability is not inherent or inevitable given a particular medical
condition;53 rather, it depends upon the particular social context in which one lives and
functions.54 Upon theorizing that the primary disadvantages associated with disability
are social structures and practices, the claim that society has some responsibility to
remedy the disadvantage may follow more naturally.55 Accordingly, whereas the
medical model facilitates medical solutions to adjust the individual to fit society, the
social model focuses on adjusting the social environment to fit individuals.56
Social modelists do not ignore the role of physiology in producing disadvantage.
However, as alluded to earlier, the physiological aspect is distinguished from disability
under the rubric of impairment.57 Tom Shakespeare, in his essay on the social model of
disability, notes that key to the social model of disability is a series of dichotomies,
one of which is that impairment is distinguished from disability.58 For example,
blindness is a biological impairment that limits a respective individual’s participation
in society. Even if society could entirely accept blind individuals, without bias or
stereotyping, and could restructure architecture to take account of their needs, there
would still be physiological limitations for such individuals. Moreover, physiological
conditions must be taken into account—even under the social model of disability—
when it comes to providing access or accommodations through architectural changes.59
Nevertheless, the key claim under the social model is that disability is, by definition,
altogether a social construct.
The debate on welfare cogently illustrates the difference between the medical and
social models of disability. The medical model of disability is akin to a form of

53. Talk of the Nation: Beyond Affliction: Culture of Disability (NPR radio broadcast May
4, 1998).
54. Id.
55. Crossley, supra note 26, at 877–78. Because this article ties restoring the social model
of disability to a policy response, it is worth briefly addressing the recent argument that the
social model of disability has no necessary policy implications. See generally Samaha, supra
note 49. Though the question in the title of Samaha’s article—What Good is the Social Model of
Disability?—is provocative, the article itself supplies a number of answers: the social model of
disability deepens our understanding of disability causation; it breaks open policy space by
destabilizing the view that impairment-related disadvantage is simply a product of nature; and it
“speaks to normative commitments about what information is relevant to human judgment.” Id.
at 1279–81. Still, Samaha’s thesis—that there must be normative theory to justify policy
response—has appeal.
This Article operates off the (normative) institutional presumption that the ADA—
similar to other antidiscrimination statutes—is generally warranted, given the “history of
purposeful unequal treatment” people with disabilities have endured and continue to endure. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2007). Exploring in-depth the normative and philosophical theories that
might justify this predisposition may be a useful exercise, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
56. Steven R. Smith, Distorted Ideals: The “Problem of Dependency” and the Mythology of
Independent Living, 27 SOC. THEORY & P RAC. 579, 595 (2001).
57. Shakespeare, supra note 50, at 198.
58. Id. at 198–99. The two other dichotomies he notes are that the social model is
distinguished from the medical model and disabled people are distinguished from non-disabled
people (in that disabled people are a uniquely oppressed group). Id.
59. Theresia Degener, International Disability Law—A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The
Interregional Experts’ Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13–17, 1999, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
180, 182 (2000).
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conservative antiwelfare ideology, which locates the problem in the individual.60 This
ideology is typically illustrated through claims that the person just needs to “get a job”
or “stop being lazy.” Similarly, when people individualize disability, as do welfare
conservatives, they overlook the possibility that disability is a group problem.61
Conversely, the social model of disability shifts the locus of responsibility for the
problems disabled people face from the individuals themselves to their inhospitable
environments.62
Interestingly, the medical view of disability stands in stark contrast to how other
forms of discrimination are typically viewed. For example, the vast majority of people
believe that the problems besetting racial minorities, women, and homosexuals stem
not from these groups’ physiological inferiority, but from societal discrimination. 63
Discrimination against these groups is considered irrational by most; few attempt to
justify discrimination against any of these groups as acceptable. Yet many people seem
to view discrimination against disabled people as rational—the result of their own
bodies’ deficiencies—and distinguishable from other forms of discrimination.64 The
result is that even people who avoid other forms of discrimination may be apt to
rationalize disability discrimination.
However, viewing disability through a sociological lens orients it as a prejudice that
is different from other forms of discrimination in type, but not degree.65 Most people
are generally acquainted with what it means for someone to be subjected to the
discriminatory whims of culture. Accordingly, understanding disability discrimination
as another type of socially constructed bias, such as race-based or sex-based
discrimination, makes it more likely that people will support disability rights.66 In this
context, disability discrimination is the product of a society that refuses to
accommodate and include disabled individuals.
One might naturally question where the ADA fits with regard to these conceptual
models. The medical model has traditionally been the dominant conceptual paradigm
for understanding disability, but the ADA’s passage in 1990 was generally seen as a

60. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 61 (observing that the “medical model positing the problem
in the individual and the right-wing anti-welfare ideology positing the problem in the individual
seem to coincide here, although they come from different traditions”); F. Allan Hanson, Where
Have All the Abnormal People Gone?, HUMANIST , Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 29.
61. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 61. Because the medical-model positing of disability
problems in the individual is so similar to the view of those who oppose welfare, the
conservative reading of disability has seemed intuitive to most people. Id. People tend to see
disability “as a medical problem besetting an individual, or a moral problem inherent in
someone who fakes and whines.” Id.; ABC News Special (ABC television broadcast, August 17,
1995) (juxtaposing the victim mentality of disabled persons with hardworking immigrants who
earlier this century built America into the most successful and prosperous country in the world).
62. Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 599.
63. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 27–28.
64. Id. at 30, 70–73; Stein, supra note 22, at 622, 671–73. See also JAEGER & BOWMAN,
supra note 17, at 18 (noting the tendency of people to dismiss disability as anything more than a
medical issue); Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues
and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 103 (1994). As an example of this point,
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 233 (1994) (arguing
that public policy ought to “clearly admit[] that the disabled are not as able as the able”).
65. Scotch, supra note 17, at 215; JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 231.
66. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 231.
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conceptual departure from the medical model of disability.67 Instead of building on the
assumption that people’s physiological impairments were individual problems, the
ADA illuminated the social dimension of disability by providing statutory recourse to
acts of employment discrimination (Title I), mandating that public entities be
accessible (Title II), and providing the right to accommodation (Title III). The ADA
was explicitly intended to cover those who had been subjected to a history of unequal
treatment, based on physical characteristics beyond the control of such individuals. 68
Under the ADA, the focus on disability did not involve scrutinizing disabilities and
weighing severity. Rather, understanding this protected group was primarily about
comprehending that many were experiencing unwarranted and irrational
discrimination on the basis of disability.69
Viewing disability through a sociological lens also reconciles how Congress, in
drafting the ADA, could have been addressing “a discrete and insular minority”70 even
though most of us presently have one or more disability, or will become disabled in the
future.71 What Congress appears to have understood was that those with physical
impairments become a discrete and insular minority precisely because they are denied
access and accommodation, and made to feel abnormal from the rest of society.72 The
experience of disability for these people is not about their impairment, but
discrimination.73 Thus, disability appears to have been understood by the ADA’s
framers as a term having sociological dimensions.74 From this vantage point, the

67. Rovner, supra note 22, at 1044; Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 62 (2000) (“[The ADA] reject[ed] the
‘medical’ model of disability in that none of its provisions address[ed] rehabilitation.”); see also
JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 173–74 (observing that the ADA was predicated on a social model
of disability).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (describing the purposes of the ADA); JOHNSON, supra note
18, at 182–83.
69. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 182−83. As an analogue, Johnson observes that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was not about the epistemic bounds of race or sex, but the reality of
discrimination. Id. at 201.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
71. This perspective is premised on the notion of a continuous spectrum that includes a
wide range of ability and disability. RILEY, supra note 17, at 8. Under this conception of
disability, the population is not split neatly into groups of disabled and nondisabled. Id. Rather,
in this context, at any point in time, a person falls somewhere on the spectrum and over time will
move with inevitability toward the end that represents a greater degree of disability. Id. For
example, one may presently have 20/20 eyesight, but in thirty years may need glasses, and in
another thirty years, be legally blind.
72. Mary Johnson observes that the ADA was intended for those individuals who had been
subjected to a history of discriminatory treatment on the basis of disability. “That was [who]
constituted the minority—not the type of disability; not the severity of disability; not the
functional limitation it caused or how ‘substantially’ it ‘limited’ any of what could be concocted
by bureaucrats as a ‘major life activity’—but the [discriminatory] treatment by others.”
JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 182–183.
73. Id.; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining how disability is largely
constitutive of one’s social context).
74. This is even clearer from language in the ADA discussing those disabled as “faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Significantly,
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significance of disability, like race or sex, is not that someone might have a disability
(or race or sex), but that its existence is a source of unwarranted and irrational bias in
this culture.
Despite the ADA’s conceptual bent, a social view of disability has not taken root in
America. The idea of disability as a social construct had not taken hold in the national
consciousness when the ADA was signed; over fifteen years later, there has been little
progress in that direction.75 Rather, the medical model remains firmly entrenched,
aided by the media and reflected in the recent decisions handed down by federal
courts. And this entrenchment is not only academic. There are significant
consequences to adopting one model of disability or another. In fact, popular and
judicial opinions about protections for those with disabilities depend largely on how
people conceptualize disability and the nature of problems faced by people with
physical impairments.76 Indeed, one scholar has observed that the overarching
disagreement regarding the ADA can rightly be characterized as a “clash of
perspectives” about the meaning of disability.77 The next Section will examine the
medical model’s entrenchment in the public sphere.
B. Publicly: The Medical Paradigm of Disability Reigns
The distinction between the medical and social models is of paramount importance
to an understanding of the media and disability. Nearly all the problems in the
representation of people with disabilities can be traced to the imposition of the
medical model . . . .78
The cultural representation of people with disabilities affects our understanding of
what it means to be human; in more practical terms, it affects public policy, the
allocation of social resources, and the meaning of civil rights.79

Despite the enactment of the ADA and years for disability advocates to advance
their cause, the medical model of disability remains firmly ensconced in our culture’s
collective consciousness.80 This entrenchment in culture, and more specifically, in the
media, has been important. Mass media representation of disability has a powerful
the visible majority—from popular culture to federal judges—have interpreted disability in quite
the opposite way. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 174–75.
75. See Rovner, supra note 22, at 1086. Rovner notes that although disability advocates
invoked the language of civil rights leading up to passage of the ADA, the statute’s “‘major
philosophical underpinnings ha[ve] never really entered the national consciousness.’” Id. at
1087 (quoting JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 237).
76. Scotch, supra note 17, at 214.
77. Id. at 213−14 (interpreting this “clash” as existing between the medical and
sociopolitical models of disabilities).
78. RILEY, supra note 17, at 12.
79. JAEGER & B OWMAN, supra note 17, at 95 (quoting Michael Berube, The Cultural
Representation of People with Disabilities Affects Us All, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 1997,
at B4–B5).
80. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 237; RILEY, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that “examples of
the medical model persistently dominate the mainstream press”); Crossley, supra note 18, at
653. Contra Hanson, supra note 60, at 29 (arguing that the present uncertainty surrounding the
terms used to refer to people with disabilities (e.g., handicapped, disabled, differently-abled,
limited, challenged) is indicative that the medical model of disability is losing ground).
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effect on how people understand disabled individuals.81 Indeed, much of what we
know about any given subject comes from what we see on television or in the
movies.82 The predominance of the medical model of disability in the media has left
many people with a jaded view of disability.83 Popular images and statements about
disability have reinforced popular stereotypes and created inaccurate assumptions
about what it means to be disabled.84 In particular, these representations have informed
the perceptions of employers who must abide by the provisions of the ADA.85 Thus,
such representations (or misrepresentations) not only inform a conception of disability,
but also implicitly downplay legal protections available for people with disabilities.86
The National Council on Disability has reported that “[n]egative impressions of the
ADA fostered by media mischaracterizations have fostered widespread
misunderstanding of the Act’s purposes and vision . . . .”87 Moreover, the media’s
propagation of a medicalized image of disability has had negative effects in the areas
of unemployment, health care, education, social policy, and “the unquantifiable factor
of self-esteem.”88

81. JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 100; see generally RILEY, supra note 17
(examining the influence the media’s portrayal of disability has on public perception); Cary
LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler’s Despair: The Portrayal of the
Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223,
223 (2000) (noting the power of the media “not just to reflect but to shape public opinion”).
82. LaCheen, supra note 81, at 223.
83. The media have played a critical role in aiding cultural hostility toward disability
through reifying unexamined assumptions about disability. Ware, supra note 40, at 108. In
particular, the medical model’s grip on society has obscured cultural views on the morality of
access and accommodation. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 238; Scotch, supra note 17, at 219–20.
84. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 7 (2005); JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 100; RILEY, supra note 17, at
xiv; SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 30; S WITZER, supra note 41, at 40–43 (explaining how the media
have pigeonholed people with disabilities into common stereotypes); RIGHTING THE ADA, supra
note 10, at 40.
85. Scotch, supra note 17, at 217. For example, the employment provisions of the ADA
define a qualified person with a disability as one who can perform the essential functions of a
job with or without reasonable accommodation. Id. Accordingly, “the perceptions and
expectations associated with disability and work help to shape judgments about the capacity of
persons with a disability to perform adequately within specific environments.” Id.
86. “Opinions about the Americans with Disabilities Act depend to a large extent on how
one defines disability and the nature of the problems faced by people who have disabilities.”
Scotch, supra note 17, at 214. As noted above, these definitions and understandings of disability
are shaped largely by the media. See supra notes 78–82, and accompanying text. As an example,
the cultural emphasis on finding a cure for disabilities neglects the current need disabled
individuals have for access, accommodation, and non-discrimination—the very intent of the
ADA. See infra Part I.B.2.
87. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA, NO. 5,
NEGATIVE MEDIA PORTRAYALS OF THE ADA 5 (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/pdf/negativemedia.pdf [hereinafter NEGATIVE MEDIA PORTRAYALS];
RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 40 (observing that media characterizations have placed
the ADA “in a highly unfavorable light and plac[ed] a negative ‘spin’ on the ADA, the court
decisions interpreting it, and its impact on American society”).
88. RILEY, supra note 17, at 1.
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Mary Johnson’s book Make Them Go Away furthered the conversation about
disability and the media a few years ago by identifying Clint Eastwood and
Christopher Reeve as two controversial cultural markers of the discourse about
disability.89 This Section will tread in her footsteps by further analyzing these and
other well-known media representations of disability over the last decade. These
representations are critical primarily because they have reinforced stereotypes
predicated on the medical paradigm of disability.
1. Clint Eastwood and his Million Dollar Baby
Though not disabled, Clint Eastwood was one of the most outspoken and visible
representations for how to view disability and the ADA at the turn of the twentieth
century.90 After being sued for access violations91 at the Mission Ranch Hotel he
owned in California, Eastwood soon began to come after the ADA. Eastwood had
spent $6.7 million remodeling his luxury hotel in Carmel, but had not ensured the
bathrooms and parking lot were accessible for people with disabilities.92 A patron with
disabilities sued, claiming these restrooms were inaccessible and that the only
accessible guest room cost more than double the price of other rooms in the hotel.93
Eastwood ultimately lost and was ordered to bring his hotel into compliance with the
ADA, but first spent $600,000 fighting the lawsuit.94
Eastwood’s response to the lawsuit was to criticize the ADA by claiming it filled
the pockets of attorneys, but did not help the disabled; he argued that the typical
lawyer “drives off in a big Mercedes and the disabled person ends up riding off in a
wheelchair.”95 Angered by the lawsuit, Eastwood went to Congress to lobby for a bill

89. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 18.
90. Clint Eastwood stated he was not opposed to the ADA, but only certain provisions.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, the important point is that he was perceived as
opposed to the ADA.
91. Eastwood was sued under Title III of the ADA, which requires businesses to make their
goods and services accessible to those with disabilities.
92. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2; James C. Harrington, Editorial, Even Movie Stars Have
to Abide by the Law, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 17, 2000, at 5B.
93. Lennard J. Davis, Why ‘Million Dollar Baby’ Infuriates the Disabled, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
2, 2005, at Tempo 1.
94. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2; Diane Carman, Disabled v. Eastwood, Round Two,
DENVER POST, January 30, 2005, at C1. The amount of money spent by Eastwood defending his
case marks a disturbing trend identified by disability advocates: that some defendants who are
sued under Title III would rather spend money fighting their suit than simply comply. SWITZER,
supra note 41, at 130–31.
95. Congress Hears Testimony on Adding New Notice Provision to Title II of ADA;
Eastwood Leads Charge, 17 DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULLETIN, June 2000. It is unclear where
Eastwood was getting his facts. Prior to making this statement, Eastwood had escaped any
monetary liability to the plaintiff, despite a jury’s affirmative finding of access violations.
COLKER, supra note 84, at 171. Moreover, concerns over plaintiff’s lawyers getting rich off the
ADA are generally unfounded. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 129 (observing the results of one
study that found when a disabled plaintiff suffered a serious physical injury because of faulty
accessibility standards, the typical award was about $10,000). This is especially true in cases
like the one brought against Eastwood, where the disabled person seeking accessibility has not
suffered any serious physical injury. Id.
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that, if passed, would have required a ninety-day notification by letter before a
disabled patron could file suit.96 (Interestingly, Eastwood may well have received
advance notification of the suit against him. The plaintiff alleged that he sent a
certified letter to Eastwood regarding the violations and that Eastwood simply refused
to sign for it.97) The plaintiff questioned why disabled persons should be the only class
of persons required to send letters.98 African-Americans and women barred from
facilities had never been required to send a letter to an entity in advance of suing
them.99
Eastwood argued that ADA attorneys “cloak themselves under the guise they’re
doing a favor for the disabled when they are really doing a disservice,” and later went
so far as to assert that the ADA, as it existed, was harming disabled people.100
Eastwood argued the ADA amounted to “a form of extortion.”101 In his words,
“everything is litigious and it’s not fair. It’s not fair to the disabled, and that’s what
I’m here for, is the disabled.”102 It is not exactly clear what he meant by any of these
statements, especially regarding how the ADA was unfair to people with disabilities.
But the significance of Eastwood’s claims has less to do with the details of his
complaints and more to do with the hodgepodge of messages he was sending to the
public: the ADA is a failure; disabled people are getting more than they deserve; there

96. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2; Davis, supra note 93, at 1. This amendment would have
weakened the ADA by encouraging noncompliance with a statute that was predicated on
voluntary compliance. Harrington, supra note 92, at 5B; S WITZER, supra note 41, at 2 (citing a
statement issued by the Clinton Administration that the proposed amendment would “unduly
burden legitimate ADA enforcement activity” by undermining voluntary compliance).
Accordingly, Harrington—director of the Texas Civil Rights Project in Austin—poses the
following hypothetical: “Why should a grandmother who wants to go to a restaurant with her
family or a husband who wants to go shopping for his ill wife have to give a 90-day notices
before being assured they can use a facility that everyone else uses?” Harrington, supra note 92,
at 5B. This type of criticism is consonant with other advocacy groups and commentators who
argued at the time of the lawsuit that businesses with good intentions needed no special
invitation to comply with a law passed by Congress and signed by the President nearly ten years
ago. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2; PR NEWSWIRE , NAPAS’ Message to Dirty Harry: Make our
Day and Leave the ADA Alone, May 17, 2000 (arguing that “[a]nyone who truly cares about
accessibility has had ample opportunity to find out what the [ADA] requires and to conform
their conduct to the law”).
97. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 153 (explaining how consultant Fred Shotz reviewed the
legal papers in Eastwood’s case and concluded, for the Congressional hearing: “Clint Eastwood
did not tell you about the certified letter that was sent to him—that he refused to sign for, and
that got returned to the plaintiff’s attorney. That, I believe, is called ‘notice’”). However,
Eastwood’s claim in court papers and congressional testimony was that he was never notified in
the first place.
98. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2.
99. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 29; SWITZER, supra note 41, at 2.
100. Hardball with Chris Matthews: Americans with Disabilities Act at Center of New
Controversy (MSNBC television broadcast, May 17, 2000) [hereinafter Hardball]. When asked
about his approaching testimony before Congress (concerning the need to amend the ADA to
give businesses ninety days to right their premises), Eastwood claimed “I’m just going to be
here to help out, because I believe that this is harming disabled people.” Id.
101. Davis, supra note 93, at 1.
102. Hardball, supra note 100.
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is no reason a private business like mine should be forced to accommodate disabled
individuals.103 Interestingly, Eastwood’s comments were consistent with the medical
paradigm of disability. First, he appeared publicly to ignore—and even downplay—the
societal barriers (in this case, physical and attitudinal) that often constitute a person’s
experience of disability. Second, Eastwood’s attitude regarding the ADA focused on
the disabled individual. By alleging that the ADA amounted to extortion and was not
fair, Eastwood implied that disabled individuals were getting something they did not
deserve, and that the quality of their life experience was not his (or society’s)
responsibility.
Though he repeatedly claimed he was not against the ADA, Eastwood had an effect
on the public’s views. As one commentator noted, “[p]eople don’t want Dirty Harry
telling them they’re on the wrong side.”104 Disability activist and author Mary Johnson
observes that it was hard at that time to find a celebrity, or anyone people knew, who
was for disability rights. 105 The result was that people were hearing one side: the case
against disability rights.
The simple fact was that people knew Clint Eastwood, and his ADA fight got wide,
and sympathetic, media coverage. In the days leading up to the Congressional hearing
over the notification bill he supported, he appeared on the talk shows Crossfire and
Hardball, and was covered in a Fox News Special.106 Countless newspapers published
his comments.107 In fact, Newsweek used the “Mercedes” quote on its “Perspectives”
page.108 This type of coverage allowed him to affect people’s views on the ADA.
Though he claimed to speak as a “common person,” his involvement turned into the
equivalent of a media slam.109
A few years later, Eastwood again rocked the disability community with a movie
that had the nation’s attention. Million Dollar Baby110 garnered mounds of awards111

103. See COLKER, supra note 84, at 7 (observing generally that the media barrage against the
ADA caused people to think the statute was producing an “inappropriate windfall” for disabled
plaintiffs); NEGATIVE MEDIA PORTRAYALS, supra note 87, at 9–12 (arguing that among the
myths about disability perpetuated by the media are the myths that “It is too easy to qualify as
having a disability under the ADA” and “The ADA permits fringe lawsuits by persons who
should not be protected by the Act”). See generally LaCheen, supra note 81 (examining the
negative messages the media sends about disability and the ADA).
104. Howard Mintz, Eastwood Spared ‘Fistful of Dollars’ in Discrimination Verdict, KNIGHT
RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 30, 2000.
105. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 23.
106. Id. at 2 (citing Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, May 18, 2000); Hardball, supra
note 100; Special Report, (Fox News television broadcast, May 18, 2000)).
107. E.g., Bob Dart, Eastwood to Congress: Make My Day, PALM BEACH POST, May 19,
2000, at 1A; Editorial, Nobles and Knaves, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A11; Maria A.
Gaura, Eastwood in Court to Answer ADA Suit, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 2000, at A19; Rafael
Lorente, Eastwood Pleads for ADA Redress: Actor-Hotel Owner Says Lawyers Sue
Indiscriminately, SUN-SENTINEL (South Florida), May 19, 2000, at 3A; Mintz, supra note 104;
Michelle Mittelstadt, Celebrities Use Star Power to Sway Policy on Capitol Hill, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 20, 2000, at 1A; Jim Vandehei, Clint Eastwood Saddles Up For
Disability-Act Showdown, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2000, at A28;.
108. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 2 (citing Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2000).
109. Mittelstadt, supra note 107, at 1A.
110. MILLION DOLLAR BABY (Warner Brothers 2004).
111. On top of countless nominations, the movie won Golden Globes for Best Director and
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and arguably broached the controversial idea that a disabled life is one not worth
living. In the movie, the main character, Maggie (Hilary Swank) seeks out Frankie
(Clint Eastwood) to train her to become a championship boxer. Maggie has had a
difficult life, but is determined to be a success in something. Frankie initially refuses to
train a female boxer, but Maggie’s persistence wins him over and he agrees to be her
coach. Under his tutelage, she becomes an unbeatable boxer—until she breaks her
neck in a fight and becomes a quadriplegic. At that point, Maggie soon gives up her
will to live and begs to be euthanized by Frankie. She compares herself to a sick dog
that needs to be taken out into the woods and shot. After some time spent agonizing
over the request, Frankie unplugs her ventilator and injects an overdose of adrenaline
into her IV.
Though there are many profound messages in this movie, one possible takeaway is
troubling: Certain disabilities, like those experienced by a quadriplegic, make life not
worth living.112 Disability activists worry that this movie sends a dangerous message
about the intrinsic worth of people with disabilities.113 They argue that a disabled
individual’s desire to end her life typically stems from depression, lack of access to
pain medication, or the sense that she is a burden to others.114 These activists are
concerned that the message in Million Dollar Baby obscures the reality that there are
options other than death for a person in Maggie’s situation.115
Many film critics have defended the movie for its artistic worth,116 and Eastwood
himself stated that one does not “have to like incest to watch Hamlet.”117 However,
parts of the disability community recalled Eastwood’s Mission Ranch lawsuit and
found his subsequent involvement in Million Dollar Baby to be less about art and more
about an agenda.118 For example, shortly after the movie opened, the National Spinal
Best Actress and won Oscars for Best Picture, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, and Best
Director.
112. One Chicago-based activist group “Not Dead Yet” has worried that the movie “gives
emotional life to the ‘better dead than disabled’ mindset lurking in the heart of the typical (read:
nondisabled) audience member.” Sharon Waxman, Groups Criticize ‘Baby’ for Message on
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at E1. Marcie Roth, executive director of the National
Spinal Cord Injury Association, said that Million Dollar Baby perpetuates the exact message that
her organization works hard to dispel. David Germain, Critics Enter Ring Against Eastwood
Over Dark Plot Twist in ‘Baby,’ ASSOC. P RESS, Feb. 4, 2005.
113. Susan LoTempio, Eastwood Delivers Blow to Understandings of Disabilities, BUFFALO
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2005, at H1; Dianne Williamson, Eastwood Film Ending Disquieting; ‘Baby’ a
Story About One Woman’s Choice, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2005, at B1.
114. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 150.
115. Laura Hershey, a Denver disability-rights activist, claims that instead of offering the
disabled assisted suicide, they should be offered helpful solutions. Carman, supra note 94, at C1.
In Maggie’s situation, these solutions might have included counseling or some other means of
helping her deal with her depression. Davis, supra note 93, at 1. Other options might have
included occupational therapy and physical therapy. Ann Neville-Jan, Life’s Worth More than a
Million, SAN G ABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., Feb. 6, 2005.
116. See, e.g., Roger Ebert, Telling Tales, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Feb. 3, 2003, at P38
(“A movie is not good or bad because of its content, but because of how it handles its content.”).
Another critic defended the movie by arguing that more than being prescriptive, the film is
telling a story of one particular woman and the decision she makes in her particular context.
David Edelstein, Beating Up Baby, SLATE, Jan. 26, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112695/.
117. Waxman, supra note 112, at E1 (quoting Clint Eastwood).
118. Eastwood insisted there was no agenda, hidden or otherwise. “I’m just telling a story,”
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Cord Injury Association issued a press release entitled Eastwood Continues Vendetta
with ‘Million Dollar Baby,’ in which they alleged that Eastwood’s current movie was
simply a continuation of an assault against the ADA begun years ago.119 Others did not
accept the connection that Eastwood was getting revenge for the previous ADA
litigation.120
Yet, perhaps as before with Eastwood’s comments regarding disability and the
ADA, motives are irrelevant. Indeed, the efforts by commentators to bifurcate art and
advocacy 121 miss the reality of how the two often overlap. Movies are different than a
piece of culturally abstract art; such productions are often a critical source of
information for people.122 Accordingly, there must be some responsibility in taking on
subjects as important as those contained in Million Dollar Baby;123 though difficult to
quantify, the message a movie like this sends—regardless of motives or artistic
worth—affects the public and its views.124
Million Dollar Baby reflected and reinforced a medicalized view of disability. After
Maggie’s paralyzing accident, the movie shifted from its focus on her background,
determination, and tenacity to a strict focus on her physiological impairment. As noted
earlier, the medical view of disability advances medical solutions for medical
problems. In this movie, the “solution” for Maggie’s quadriplegia was euthanasia.
There was no mention of psychological counseling to aid with her transition back to
society. There was no exploration of the social pressures she would have faced as a
quadriplegic. There was only a medical solution for a medical problem. Such a script
risks implying that disability is misery, that there is no need to bother with attempting
to improve a disabled person’s life,125 and that many disabilities make life not worth
living. The message is “[t]here’s an easy way out.”126
2. “We Must Find a Cure”: Christopher Reeve and the Jerry Lewis Telethon
Though Eastwood’s “media slam” and Million Dollar Baby were widely perceived
by people with disabilities as offensive, other representations of disability have yielded
a more complex result. In particular, Christopher Reeve and the Jerry Lewis Telethon
have been two of the most well-known media representations of disability and have
he explained. “I don’t advocate. I’m playing a part. I’ve gone around in movies blowing people
away with a .44 magnum. But that doesn’t mean I think that’s a proper thing to do.” Chris Lee,
‘Baby’ Plot Twists Angers Activists; A Group Alleges that the Movie is Part of a ‘Vendetta’ by
Eastwood, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at E5; but see Davis, supra note 93, at 1 (expressing
skepticism about Eastwood’s status as “an impartial artist,” in light of the fact that he chose,
directed, produced, and acted in the film).
119. Lee, supra note 118, at E5.
120. Edelstein, supra note 116.
121. See, e.g., Editorial, Fiction on Film; Some ‘Million Dollar Baby’ Critics Forge the Role
of Art, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 1, 2005, at 10A (observing that the public too easily
confuses the distinct roles of art and advocacy).
122. COLIN BARNES & GEOF MERCER, DISABILITY 99 (2003); Davis, supra note 93, at 1;
Mintz, supra note 104.
123. James J. Murtagh, Op-Ed., Misleading Millions, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 3, 2005, at 9.
124. See id.
125. Mary Johnson, ‘Million Dollar Baby’ Cheap Shot at Disabled, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24, 2005, at B7.
126. Id. (quoting attorney Harriet McBryde Johnson).
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greatly informed people’s understanding of disability; each has been an influential
advocate in the public domain. But advocates to what end? And what messages have
they sent regarding disability?
For decades the medical model of disability has survived in the Jerry Lewis
Telethon, “the primary source of media exposure to disability for most non-disabled
Americans.”127 And for decades this fundraiser has been criticized for portraying
people with disabilities as objects of pity.128 This 21 1/2 hour media blitz held each
year on Labor Day features celebrities and simultaneously entertains, informs, and
raises funds for the research of the Muscular Dystrophy Association.129
The Telethon has reinforced the medical paradigm of disability by focusing on the
physiological condition of disability.130 It has also created and shaped one of two
predominant roles under the medical model of disability—the “pitiable poster
child.”131 The poster child role has mainstream acceptance in society because it is
comfortable for those without disabilities. Instead of having to abandon stereotypes
and think of disabled people as contributing members of society, this role allows a
non-disabled person to simply write a check.132 When disability is represented in this
way, it sends the subtle message that disability “is best remedied through treating the
individual . . . rather than through reforming societal institutions.”133 (Of course,
helping individuals and remedying societal discrimination are not mutually exclusive

127. RILEY, supra note 17, at 13; see also JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US
WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 35 (1998) (observing that surveys
have shown that more people form attitudes about disabilities from telethons than any other
source); Steven Tingus, Telethon Broadcasts the Wrong Message, D ENVER POST, Sept. 4, 2000,
at B10 (calling the Telethon “the nation’s most visible disability event”); Michael Volkman,
Telethons Wring Cash and Emotions, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2000, at B1
(observing that telethons have enormous power to shape people’s views of disability since they
are seen by hundreds of millions of people). Moreover,
[I]t can be very hard to understand disability if one has neither experienced a
disability nor has been close to someone who has a disability. . . . Astoundingly,
many people in the United States form their attitudes about disability based on the
portrayals of persons with disabilities in telethons and other charitable functions.
JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 18.
128. See, e.g., Albin Krebs & Robert M. Thomas, ‘Kids’ Called Miscast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1981, at C24 (reciting a statement from disability activists that the “emphasis on ‘Jerry’s
kids’—pale, wan, brave but probably doomed—has helped create a stereotype of disabled
persons and led to wrong public policies”). Though the Telethon focuses only on the MDA
cause, whatever it conveys sends a message about all people with disabilities. Stephen J. Taylor,
MDA Unleashes Onslaught: The Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Labor Day Telethon, POSTSTANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 3, 1993, at A13.
129. Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon, http://www.mdausa.org/telethon.
130. Professor Charles A. Riley II has noted that productions like the Telethon have “an
inherent medical bent” and perpetuate the tendency to “consign disability to an issue of the
body.” RILEY, supra note 17, at 13–14.
131. See id. at 110–12 (discussing the “invention” and history of the disabled poster child to
generate funds for national disability charities).
132. Yvonne Duffy, Is it Time for Jerry’s ‘Kids’ to Emcee?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1993, at
N15.
133. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Comparative Disability Employment Law from an American
Perspective, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 649, 659 (2003).
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goals.) The concern is that the Telethon stigmatizes disabled people as crippled,
childlike, and desperately in need of help.134
In the context of the Telethon, the medical model of disability is repackaged as a
type of “charity model.”135 From this conceptual angle, to be disabled is to be in need
of a cure. In the case of the Telethon, pity and paternalism are readily apparent at the
outset, given the designation of anyone with muscular dystrophy as one of “Jerry’s
kids.”136 One subtle message sent by this label is that all people with disabilities are
helpless and childlike, requiring someone else to decide what they need and provide it
for them.137 The Telethon also sends this message by focusing on children as
exemplars of people with disabilities.138 Even the rhetoric of disability in the Telethon
has reified stereotypes based on pity and paternalism. A former “Jerry’s kid” writes:
“Speaking of ‘the dystrophic child’s plight,’ or calling disability a ‘curse’ reinforces
the offensive stereotype that we are victims. . . . Similarly, phrases like ‘dealt a bad
hand’ and ‘got in the wrong line’ are unfair. Disability is not ‘bad’ or ‘wrong.’”139
Accordingly, critics have claimed that the Telethon represents disabled individuals as
tragic victims in need of charity.140 From this characterization, a couple of related
concerns emerge.
134. CHARLTON, supra note 127, at 35 (observing that telethons are “for” disabled people—
“especially, poor, pathetic, crippled children”).
135. See MARTA RUSSELL, BEYOND RAMPS: DISABILITY AT THE END OF THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 86 (1998); JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 15 (explaining that the medical
language of disability quickly became the social language of disempowerment).
136. RUSSELL, supra note 135, at 85–86 (“Disabled people do not want to be called ‘kids’
any more than a black man wants to be called ‘boy.’”); Volkman, supra note 127, at B1;
Primetime Live (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Primetime].
137. Volkman, supra note 127, at B1.
138. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
1352 n.42 (1993). The disabled adult is lost in the all-consuming focus on disabled children. For
example, people with disabilities are rarely referred to as Mr., Ms., or Mrs., but only by their
first names. Id. Moreover, rarely are the images of disability focused on working adults who
need money to assist them in their day-to-day living expenses. Id.
139. Ben Mattlin, Op-Ed., An Open Letter to Jerry Lewis: The Disabled Need Dignity, Not
Pity, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at M3. Moreover, language such as “wheelchair-bound” feeds
the medical paradigm of disability by creating the perception of an individual that is based
solely on one’s disability. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 11. To be fair, the Telethon has not been
alone in exemplifying such linguistic deficiencies. Even well-respected publications, such as the
New York Times, have allowed similar phrasings to “slip through the cracks every year.” RILEY,
supra note 17, at 50–51. Professor Charles Riley II has shown that according to its own Web site
search engine, the Times has been a chronic disability offender, regularly employing phrases like
“wheelchair-bound” and “confined to a wheelchair.” Id.
140. E.g., LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 29 (2003); Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias
or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 169 (2000); Susan Harrigan,
Controversy Hits Lewis Telethon; Comic Stereotypes the Disabled, Critics Say, WASH. POST,
Sept. 1, 1992, at B3; Susan Plese, Despite Obstacles, A Place of Her Own, HARTFORD COURANT,
Jan. 26, 1995, at 3 (“When I was 16 most of what I knew about my future came from the Jerry
Lewis Telethon,” she said. “I thought I would die real soon because that’s what they teach
you.”); Joseph Shapiro, Disabling ‘Jerry’s Kids’, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 14,
1992, at 39; Tingus, supra note 127, at B10; Primetime, supra note 136.
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The first concern is that such images reinforce the discriminatory notion that
disabled people must have their needs met through charity, rather than through the
enforcement of their own rights.141 In this context, the Telethon (or a Telethon-like
event) enables non-disabled persons to disengage from deconstructing their own
potential discriminatory views by making a financial donation.142 One scholar has
observed that such “[p]olicies and programs[, which are] based on pity[,] are [seen by
the public as] acceptable because they make disabled people nonthreatening.”143 Such
paternalism has been criticized as an example of how non-disabled individuals are able
to dominate the discourse about disability with “implicitly patronizing sentiments” and
a “slight tone of condescension.”144 The second concern is that it is difficult to feel pity
for people with disabilities and also view them as having the same entitlement to rights
as people without disabilities.145 Accordingly, some scholars have noted that where
such charity and paternalism are present, people are discouraged from wholly
accepting others with disabilities—a necessary prerequisite for their integration into
America’s social fabric.146 Former chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) Evan Kemp Jr.—who is himself disabled—observed that these
stereotypes are perpetuated by the Telethon and actually increase discrimination.147 He
questioned why employers would hire disabled people when admired public figures on
the Telethon portrayed them as helpless.148

141. Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure
of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1405, 1417 (1999).
142. See Duffy, supra note 132, at N15.
143. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 12.
144. Hahn, supra note 140, at 181.
145. Rebecca Nappi, Reeve’s Help for Disabled Had Its Limits, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane,
Wash.), Nov. 6, 2004, at B1 (quoting Marshall Mitchell, who teaches disability studies at
Washington State University); see also Rovner, supra note 22, at 1043–45 (observing that under
the “medical” model of disability, the characterization of people with disabilities as incapable
and dependent is a set-up for social and economic isolation).
146. Eichhorn, supra note 141, at 1417; see Stein, supra note 22, at 625–26 (observing that
recognizing disabled persons as equal “requires a general transformation in social attitudes, most
especially acknowledgement of disability rights as rights rather than as a product of goodwill”).
See generally Hahn, supra note 140, at 181–82 (noting that in many respects, “paternalism may
be an even more formidable obstacle in the struggle for equality than direct conflict or hostility”
and discussing the “hegemony of paternalism”).
147. See Evan Kemp Jr., Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981, at
A19; Harrigan, supra note 140, at B3; Primetime, supra note 136. Significantly, Kemp was
quite knowledgeable about the subject of his critique because his parents were part of the group
that founded the Muscular Dystrophy Association and later put together the first telethon.
SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 20–21.
148. Harrigan, supra note 140, at B3; Primetime, supra note 136; see also Shapiro, supra
note 140, at 39 (quoting one critic who called the Telethon “a relic of an era when disabled
people were thought to need charity, not integration into everyday life”). Accordingly, David
Engel and Frank Munger—drawing on the centrality of work to a person’s identity—have
observed that the identities of persons with disabilities are typically “spoiled” by the
presumption that they are incapable of work. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS
OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 114
(2003). They note that those who are unable to work are typically seen as persons who are not

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=980177

202

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 83:181

Some critics speculate that this annual fundraiser has been allowed to play on
stereotypes in part because of its ability to generate huge contributions for research and
treatment.149 And given some of the Telethon’s supporters’ defenses, this “ends justify
the means” rationale must be at work. Consider the title of one Telethon apologist’s
editorial: Answering Lewis’ Critics American People Pledged 45.1M During
Telethon.150 Most critics have responded that the forfeiture of dignity and public
misperceptions about disability resulting from the Telethon are far more important
than raising money for research.151 Critics claim there is a false mutual exclusivity in
the assumption that fundraisers will either be successful or not based solely on whether
people with disabilities are portrayed as objects of pity.152
Another troubling aspect of the charity/medical model, as it is incorporated in the
Telethon, is the representation of disability as desperately requiring a cure. Attempting
to find a cure for disabilities is certainly not per se detrimental. In fact, seeking a cure
for certain disabilities is quite reasonable since many will die from their respective
disabilities if a cure is not found. This is especially the case with muscular dystrophy.
In short, seeking a cure need not be counterproductive. However, overemphasizing the
need for a cure—while simultaneously neglecting the social dimension of disability—
is damaging. To avoid sending the negative messages illuminated in this Article, there
must be sensitivity in the manner in which a cure is sought. Disability advocates have
requested that more emphasis be placed on improving disabled people’s lives.153 They
argue that the relative (over)emphasis on finding a cure reinforces the presumption that
the elimination of the impairment is the appropriate solution to being disabled;154
entitled to the full respect due an adult citizen; instead, they are seen as marginal and dependent
on others. Id. at 116.
149. RILEY, supra note 17, at 13–14; Marta Russell, Letter to the Editor, Jerry Lewis’ MD
Telethon, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at B6 (“As for the money raised . . . dignity is not for
sale.”).
150. Robert Ross, Answering Lewis’ Critics American People Pledged 45.1M During
Telethon, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 14, 1991, at A7 (summarily claiming that the
money raised is a response to critics of the Telethon).
151. Drimmer, supra note 138, at 1352 n.42 (arguing that “the forfeiture of dignity and
continued oppression of a struggling minority” is not worth the money raised for research);
Duffy, supra note 132, at N15 (arguing that telethon payments allow non-disabled persons to
disengage from their discriminatory views); Tingus, supra note 127, at B10 (arguing that the net
benefits of the Telethon’s fundraising for medical research are dwarfed by the overall damage
done to the struggle for independence and respect by people with disabilities); Primetime, supra
note 136 (explaining that though critics acknowledge all that Lewis has done, especially the
billion dollars he has raised, they conclude that “this kind of charity costs them too much”).
Additionally, critics have decried the Telethon’s implicit approach of making the non-disabled
audience feel guilty for being “normal,” in order to encourage donations. RUSSELL, supra note
135, at 85.
152. One disability advocate has observed that both the National Easter Seal Society and
United Cerebral Palsy Association have junked the pity approach for their telethons. SHAPIRO,
supra note 44, at 24. And in the case of the Easter Seal Telethon, its numbers increased from
$23 million in 1985 to $42 million in 1992, disproving the idea that a telethon must focus on
portraying those with disabilities in a childlike and helpless manner. Id. Still, some critics have
argued that no telethon is a good telethon as any will still have overtones that divide the world
into the “lucky” and “unlucky,” “them” and “us.” Id.
153. Harrigan, supra note 140, at B3.
154. Hahn, supra note 140, at 169.
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however, without a change in attitudes, a “cure” will not fix most of the problems
disabled people face.155
This is where fundraising efforts like the Telethon encounter a fundamental catch22.156 In order to raise money, the Telethon overemphasizes the need for a cure. But in
doing so, it sends the message that anyone with a disability should not be content with
her current condition. The subtle message is that disability is unacceptable; a cure must
be found.157 Thus, the conundrum: finding a way to encourage generous contributions
like those the Telethon has received over the years, “without resorting to the timetested pity and fear tactics that the medical model provides.”158 As previously
mentioned, critics insist this is a false tension and that money could be raised without
portraying those with disabilities in such a paternalistic manner. Susan G. Komen for
the Cure and its ongoing fight against breast cancer may provide a good model for
non-paternalistic fundraising and advocacy.159
Still, the Telethon has continued to characterize disabled people with great pity and
charity.160 Accordingly, the Telethon has been accused of sending the message that a
life disabled is not one worth living by its inordinate focus on finding a cure.161 These
sentiments have at times been communicated in even more explicit terms. Evan Kemp
had this to say about the Telethon: “Pity and compassion are close, but there’s a
distinction. Last year Jerry Lewis said that if he found out he had Lou Gehrig’s
disease, he’d shoot himself. That’s wrong. I know many people with this disease who
are leading productive lives . . . [t]hey shouldn’t be stigmatized.”162

155. Duffy, supra note 132, at N15 (“To say that a cure is the answer is not only dishonest
but perpetuates the myth that we need cures more than decent housing or jobs.”).
156. See Alan Cullison, Survey Shows Most Americans Feel Awkward Around the Disabled,
HARTFORD C OURANT, Sept. 11, 1991, at A3.
157. Volkman, supra note 127, at B1; see RUSSELL, supra note 135, at 87.
158. RILEY, supra note 17, at 14; see SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 23 (posing the quandary as
whether or not MDA officials listen to their critics and sacrifice what is seemingly the most
effective money-making pitch).
159. See WIKIPEDIA, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Susan_G._Komen_for_the_Cure.
160. Lewis appears to continue to defend such pity tactics. When disability activists recently
protested at one of his engagements, Lewis responded by denouncing them and storming off the
stage. According to a recording made by an audience member, he reacted with the following
question: “They want me to stop the telethon because I make them look pitiful, what is more
pitiful than this?” E.A. Torriero, Foes of Lewis Telethon Most Uncharitable; Comedian is
Scornful of Activist Critics as He Prepares for 40th Annual Muscular Dystrophy Fundraiser,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2006, at C4 (documenting how Lewis is still hounded by disabled activists
contending that the show is designed to evoke pity, rather than empower the disabled).
161. See Dianne B. Piastro, Living With a Disability, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 29,
1990, at D3; Shapiro, supra note 140, at 39 (observing that MDA Executive Director Robert
Ross has called living with a disability “cruel, horrible and a despicable fate”); Primetime, supra
note 136 (quoting former Jerry’s Kid Ben Mattlin, who felt that he was paraded across the stage
“as a worst-case scenario, a fate worse than death”).
162. Ken Adelman, Rolling Thunder; Evan Kemp Gets the Law Behind the Only Minority
Group Open to All Interview, WASHINGTONIAN, July 1992. During the 1991 Telethon, Lewis
said that someone diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (also known as Lou Gehrig’s
disease) “might as well put a gun in (their) mouth.” Anthony Moser, Past Prime Time, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 13, 1995, at F1.
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In sum, there are two general concerns that stem from the Telethon’s representation
of the charity/medical model of disability. One concern is that the “object of pity”
stereotypes mislead the public about what it means to actually have a disability.163
Disabled people are stigmatized as crippled, sickly people—the kind that no rational
employer would want to hire. One result of these false perceptions is the increase in
discrimination noted by Kemp, former chairman of the EEOC. A second concern is
that these characterizations create a self-fulfilling prophecy for individuals with
disabilities.164 For example, if disabled people continually hear that they are unable to
work and have productive lives, they will eventually start to believe it.165 The Jerry
Lewis Telethon has succeeded at raising money to fund research and treatment, but has
simultaneously failed disabled people through its emphases on pity, paternalism, and
finding a cure.166
After years of disappointments associated with the Telethon, one clear hope for the
disability community emerged in 1995.167 His name was Christopher Reeve. An actor
most notable for his role as Superman, Reeve became a quadriplegic through an
equestrian accident. Reeve was immediately perceived by the disabled community as
someone who would represent strength, dignity, and hope to a public inundated with
false stereotypes.168 The disabled community had never had a leader like Martin
Luther King, Jr. who could rally America for its cause;169 thus, people with disabilities
hoped Reeve would become that kind of public advocate. As the media began to
shower Reeve with attention, he soon became a prominent image in people’s minds

163. Russell, supra note 149, at B6; Volkman, supra note 127, at B1.
164. JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 20 (observing that stereotypes about disability
quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies); Tingus, supra note 127, at B10 (“Thinking of oneself
as incomplete or, even worse, as broken, serves no purpose but to internalize the inadequacy
society regularly ascribes to us.”); see also Marilyn Dahl, The Role of the Media in Promoting
Images of Disability-Disability as Metaphor: The Evil Crip, 18 CAN. J. COMM. 75, 78 (1993)
(explaining that self-identity is formed in part by what is communicated in the media).
165. James Charlton takes this idea one step further, explaining how people with disabilities
are oppressed when told by the dominant culture what they cannot do. CHARLTON, supra note
127, at 35. He notes that this type of limiting language “has a profound influence on
consciousness.” Id.
166. One activist is left with this question:
Why do print and electronic media outlets remain transfixed by the medical
miracle rather than the human-rights story? How does the old paternalism, the
poster-child mentality, manage to hang on? When will they balance mental and
physical disability? Why can’t press exposure lead to higher employment levels
for people with disabilities? How does the cycle of pity renew itself in the
nonprofit world (when will the annual black-tie balls give way to yearlong
enabling programs)?
RILEY, supra note 17, at xiii.
167. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 131 (observing that disability rights activists hoped that
someday someone with celebrity status would begin to champion disability rights).
168. Id.
169. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 69; JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 23. The other various
campaigns for civil rights had been informed by many well-recognized and outspoken voices,
including the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Gloria Steinem. Id. However, there had been no
“name” to help publicize the disability rights movement. Id.
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when they thought of disability.170 Indeed, most people and the media were soon
taking their cues from him about what was important to disabled people.171
Although Reeve was perhaps “the most famous disabled person since [Franklin D.]
Roosevelt,” he did not help the ADA’s cause.172 His representations in the media
reinforced a medicalized version of disability and typically ignored the social issues
faced by people with disabilities. In fact, Laura Rovner observed that Reeve explicitly
rejected the social view of disability and the disability rights movement by choosing to
focus his efforts on finding a cure for his disability.173 He told one reporter, “People
say to me ‘why don’t you give up on that [cure business] and work for better
conditions for people with disabilities? Work harder for the ADA, bring up people on
charges who fail to meet the access codes?’ I can’t do both effectively, in my
opinion.”174 Rovner comments, “This wholesale rejection of the socio-political model
of disability and the embracing of the medical model of disability by arguably the
nation’s most well-known disabled figure did much to further entrench society’s view
of disability as a personal, medical condition rather than a societal one.”175
Sometimes this focus on the medical aspects of disability appeared to be the choice
of the media forum. For example, when The New Yorker ran its eleven-page feature on
Christopher Reeve, it was printed under the section heading of the “Annals of
Medicine.”176 The article then proceeded to do justice to the medical paradigm by the
amount of space devoted to dramatizing the physical accident177 and detailing Reeve’s
disabled physiology.178 Charles A. Riley II has observed that disability advocates were
correct to deplore this “knee-jerk medicalization of Reeve”—especially when an
alternative characterization by The New Yorker would have made a significant
statement.179
At other times, Reeve himself facilitated a medicalized view of disability by his
asymmetric focus on finding a cure. This, above all, angered disability activists who
viewed Reeve’s inordinate focus on finding a cure as consistent with the oft-implied
idea that living with a disability is a fate worse than death.180 This latter idea
170. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 129 (noting that Reeve was selected to address the 1996
Democratic National Convention and honored as one of People magazine’s “25 Most Intriguing
People”).
171. Id. at 131.
172. Id. at 129.
173. Rovner, supra note 22, at 1088 n.253.
174. Id. (quoting Sam Maddox, Christopher Reeve: Making Sense Out of Chaos, NEW
MOBILITY, Aug. 1996).
175. Id.
176. RILEY, supra note 17, at 58–59 (observing that immediately with the Reeve article, one
is in “the realm of ‘medicalization,’ the pigeonhole to which the representation of disability has
been confined for centuries”).
177. Id. at 63 (arguing that “in terms of the medicalization syndrome,” the portion of the
article devoted to dramatizing the accident “just plunges the reader further into a view of Reeve
as a body on a gurney”).
178. Id. at 63–64 (observing that this portion of the article further reinscribes the medical
model of disability and ends up “way out of bounds,” given the direction of the article).
179. Id. at 60.
180. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 154–55 (“Although Jack Kevorkian undoubtedly is one of
the most despised and cursed individuals by many disability rights activists, he shares that
distinction with Christopher Reeve.”); see Kathi Wolfe, Disability Politics; I May Be Blind, But
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inadvertently surfaced in early interviews where Reeve discussed his struggles with
thoughts of suicide and recognizing that he was still human after his accident.181
Intermittent with these sobering confessions was his general insistence that “we must
find a cure.” In Reeve’s own words, disabled people needed to be “fixed.”182 Disability
advocates feared that he was sending a “pernicious message”: that, without a cure,
disabled people were not whole.183 Marshall Mitchell, who teaches disability studies at
Washington State University, argued that Reeve’s emphasis on finding a cure
reinforced the stereotype that having a disability was “the most awful thing in the
world.”184 Mitchell observed that “[t]he emphasis is always on the medical condition,
not the barriers placed on the person by society.”185
Reeve was accordingly unconcerned with “lower sidewalks” and “better
wheelchairs.”186 In fact, he said just that.187 This mentality infuriated disability
activists, who believed that Reeve oversimplified the complex social issue of
disability.188 Under the cure mentality (a tenet of the medical paradigm), a disabled
person must wait for a “cure” to “fix” his disability 189—a medical solution for a
medical problem. The concern is that in the meantime, critical social issues such as
access, accommodation, and discrimination are tabled.190 As Reeve pushed for a cure
and projected his disability status as one calling for no special rights, others with
disabilities worried that the social side of disability was being slighted.191
These worries and concerns are best articulated through an explanation of the
“supercrip” dysphemism. As previously discussed, there are two acceptable parts a
disabled person can play in society under the medical model of disability: the pitiable
I Can See Through These Empty Promises, WASH. POST, Sept.1, 1996, at C5 (recounting that
doctors, upon learning she was blind, told her parents they were sorry she was alive).
181. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 155.
182. Mike Ervin, Editorial, Not All Disabled People are Waiting on a ‘Fix,’ AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Aug. 31, 1996, at A15.
183. DORIS ZAMES FLEISCHER & F RIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM
CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 137 (2001); David P. Rundle, Change Views About Disabled
Rights, ADA, WICHITA EAGLE, Oct. 19, 2003, at A11 (“I have always felt Reeve’s attitude was a
bit unrealistic, but none of my business. However, I see now that he has inadvertently
perpetuated the idea that the inability to walk (or see, hear, or reason) ‘normally’ makes one less
than human.”).
184. Nappi, supra note 145, at B1 (quoting Marshall Mitchell).
185. Id.
186. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 128–29.
187. Id. When interviewed by Time, Reeve claimed to take an immediate interest in the
American Paralysis Association because “they are dedicated solely to finding a cure for
paralysis, nothing less. I liked that ideal. They’re not into lower sidewalks and better
wheelchairs.” Roger Rosenblatt, New Hopes, New Dreams, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 47.
188. SWITZER, supra note 41, at 155.
189. Id.
190. Id. (observing that Reeve’s insistence for more research appeared to isolate one element
of disability to the exclusion of the social dimension). These worries were not unjustified;
indeed, from the time Reeve was injured until his death, the ADA was under constant attack by
the media. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 7–9.
191. JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING VIOLATIONS: WAR ZONES, WHEELCHAIRS, AND
DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 204 (1995); see JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 131 (observing
that as most people and the media took their cues about what was important to disabled people
from Reeve, disability rights became less important).
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poster child or the inspirational supercrip. Reeve played the role of the supercrip
perfectly. Though too old and far too successful to be an object of childlike pity, he did
everything within his control to try to “fix” his disability, without demanding that
society accommodate him. This type of supercrip role is generally despised by the
disability community because (a) the emphasis is on overcoming one’s disability or
finding a cure, and (b) a supercrip is usually unconcerned with societal
accommodation. The supercrip role is non-threatening for people without disabilities
because it underscores the implicit notion that having a disability is bad and that
anyone disabled ought to try to overcome their disability. Such a role also deflects
attention away from issues of access, accommodation, and discrimination. This type of
characterization infuriates the disability community.192
Perhaps Reeve was focused on the physiological element of disability and
disengaged from social issues precisely because the physiological element was much
more significant to him. Reeve did not experience the same physical, attitudinal, and
architectural barriers in society that most disabled people face.193 In fact, Reeve
appeared to be “the most fortunate quadriplegic on the planet.”194 He was wealthy and
therefore able to afford the very best medical care and attention.195 Additionally, where
most disabled individuals experienced the stigma of societal exclusion, Reeve was an
insider—a former Superman who knew everyone and was generally accepted and well
respected.196 Reeve’s asymmetrical focus on finding a cure may have been due to the
fact that, for him, it was the physical element of disability that was disabling.
Nevertheless, Reeve’s representations of disability were sobering for the disability
community.197 Reeve was arguably the most famous person on earth with a

192. The “supercrip” expectation or tendency to “hero-ize” those with disabilities has been
assessed in the following way:
Turning a person with a disability into a hero is a[] common social reaction. This
reaction is interesting—on the surface it appears to be positive, but it is actually a
different type of negative reaction. The hero reaction usually appears in the form
of a compliment like, “I find you so inspiring” or “I am amazed that you can do
that” or something similar. . . . Being viewed as a hero may be better than being
viewed as a defective wretch, but both perceptions marginalize the persons in
question and make them outsiders.
JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 22; see also RILEY, supra note 17, at xiv (arguing that
when people like Reeve are jammed into prefabricated “supercrip” stories—the types intended
to sell products and reward financially—“the individual is lost in the fable”). Riley reminds
readers of the financial incentive the gatekeepers in media have to tell stories that sell.
Accordingly, he admonishes readers not to forget the dollar-and-cents dynamic that governs
what about disability makes it to the screen or page. Id. at 1.
193. Jeff Shannon, For the Disabled, Superman’s New Hollywood Role Is a Mixed Blessing,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at M1 (observing that Reeve would never have to worry about
how to pay for attendant care, expensive medical equipment, or accessibility modifications to
his home). For example, shortly after his accident, Reeve was featured at the Oscars despite the
virtual non-accessibility of the building for most disabled individuals. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. To many, Reeve—because of his societal privilege—was not properly regarded as a part
of the disability community. GERARD G ROGGIN & CHRISTOPHER NEWELL, DIGITAL DISABILITY:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY IN NEW MEDIA 133 (2003).
197. This is a generalization that is not without its exceptions. Certainly, there were some in
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disability;198 indeed, in a world full of disabled people, he alone put a contemporary
face to the issue.199 He could have been the modern-day equivalent of a Martin Luther
King Jr., petitioning society to roll back the discriminatory barriers that still confronted
the disability community. Instead, people with disabilities concluded that Reeve’s
primary interest was not disability rights. Instead, he was simply seeking a cure for his
spinal-cord injury—to become “normal” again.
3. From the Public to the Judiciary
The bottom line with the above representations of disability is that the public
constructs its view of disability based largely on what it sees and hears in the media.200
The representations discussed above are especially important because they have
garnered national attention. When a celebrity like Reeve or Eastwood speaks up, the
public listens.201 The public could hardly avoid exposure to Million Dollar Baby. And
the Jerry Lewis Telethon is watched by millions every year. These portrayals matter.
Thus, if one can acknowledge that disability discrimination is at least related to these
types of social inputs embedded in culture, it is unsurprising that federal courts have
also employed a traditional medical model of disability that focuses on the limitations
of disabled plaintiffs in their application of the ADA.202 As one professor has noted,
“Public officials and the courts frequently mirror well-established limiting
assumptions about people with disabilities.”203 Similarly, another scholar has
explained how the reasoning employed by federal courts in deciding cases under Title
I has been driven by cultural paradigms for understanding disability.204 The result is
the disabled community who were grateful for the increased hope and public awareness he
brought to those with disabilities. See, e.g., Susan Cohen, Reeve’s Legacy Helping Many, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 15, 2004, at A9; Steve Inskeep, Christopher Reeve’s Legacy for the
Disabled (National Public Radio broadcast Oct. 13, 2004). As iterated throughout this Section,
however, it was exactly this public awareness Reeve brought to disability that amplified the
content of his claims and requests, and especially their underlying presuppositions. Even in the
wake of his death—a time where criticism often turns to respectful mourning—people were still
discussing the mixed/negative messages he sent to the public about disability. Nappi, supra note
145, at B1.
198. Jon Frank & Christina Nuckols, Actor “Put a Face on Disability,” VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Oct. 12, 2004, at A1 (explaining that Reeve received worldwide recognition as a disabled
person); Rundle, supra note 183, at A11.
199. Frank & Nuckols, supra note 198, at A1 (citing activists’ observations that Reeve put a
“prominent personal face” on disability).
200. JAEGER & BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 100.
201. See Reuters, Congress Gets Visits from ‘Cause Celebrities,’ DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake
City, Utah), June 27, 2000, at A12 (explaining how celebrities, such as Eastwood and Reeve,
generate “a heap of publicity” for their causes); World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast
May 18, 2000) (explaining how celebrities generate public support for their causes).
202. Scotch, supra note 17, at 218.
203. Id.; see also O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 137−61 (explaining how federal courts were
influenced by cultural views of rehabilitation and disability). Professor Blanck has concurred
that underlying the judicial antipathy to Title I are the generally “negative attitudes in society
that continue to perpetuate prejudice toward disabled Americans.” Peter Blanck, Justice for All?
Stories About Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1,
6–7 (2004).
204. See O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 164–65.
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that media and courts’ mischaracterizations “have fed on one another” to frustrate the
ADA’s goals.205 The effect is self-perpetuating, as federal courts take cues from
culture and, in turn, re-publicize these implicit paradigms via the cases they decide.206
In sum, the entrenchment of the medical model of disability has been ubiquitous, and
as the next Section will show, the judicial system has not been immune to its reach.
C. Judicially: The Goldilocks Dilemma
[C]urrent ADA jurisprudence suggests a recommitment to a narrow and
individualistic biomedical model as the primary understanding of disability. In
each of the recent trilogy of ADA cases on standing . . . the Supreme Court
focused on the objective, biomedical nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged impairments,
and whether or not they represented a substantial personal loss of capacities. The
Court’s restrictive category of disability “reflects and reinforces the notion that
disability is an objective biomedical phenomenon that constitutes an essential
aspect of the individual.”207

In the judicial sphere, the entrenchment of the medical model—and its concomitant
focus on the physiological condition of disability—has translated into a type of
Goldilocks dilemma whereby courts are fixated on the definitional bounds of
disability. By having to fit into a very narrow construction of disability, claimants are
often found either “too disabled” or “not disabled enough” to qualify for the
protections of the ADA. Very few are “disabled just right.” Restrictive interpretations
of the ADA have thus “engendered a situation in which many cases are decided solely
by looking at the characteristics of the plaintiff.”208 The definition of disability may
thus create “the absurd result of a person being disabled enough to be fired from a job,
but not disabled enough to challenge the firing.”209
This Section will focus on Title I, as this is the part of the ADA that has been most
weakened by federal courts.210 Title I addresses employment and demands that “no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual” with regard to all major aspects of
employment.211 For plaintiffs to have standing to sue for discrimination in the

205. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 40.
206. See O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 165 (“Requests for accommodation have been
characterized by the federal courts as if disabled people thought they were exempt from the rules
. . . . Public attention is drawn from the prejudice of the employer or the barriers within the
workplace, which constitutes the crux of the disability rights model, to the person with a
disability.”).
207. Pendo, supra note 22, at 1195.
208. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 561 (1997).
209. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 16 (quoting Professor Chai Feldblum).
210. See generally Waterstone, supra note 13 (exploring how Titles II and III of the ADA
have fared much more favorably than Title I and do not present the same concerns—such as the
concerns associated with the definition of disability).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). The other main protections under the ADA are Title II,
which prohibits discrimination by public entities and Title III, which proscribes discrimination
in public accommodations and services provided by private entities. Id. §§ 12131–12189.
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workplace under Title I of the ADA, they must satisfy four threshold criteria. First,
they must prove they are disabled. This includes proof that they have an actual
disability,212 have record of a disability,213 or are regarded as disabled.214 Second, they
must be qualified to perform the essential duties of the position. Third, the
accommodations requested by the plaintiff must be reasonable. And finally, the
accommodations must not cause the employer any undue hardship. Before
adjudicating whether there has been any discrimination or illegal motive, courts often
must make these threshold determinations in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. The last two requirements pertaining to accommodations rarely come up in
ADA cases, since most are dismissed via the dual considerations of whether the person
is disabled and whether a person is qualified for the particular job.215
The most consistently litigated and frustrating provision for plaintiffs has been the
first requirement: that plaintiffs prove they are disabled.216 The ADA is a unique civil
rights statute because it requires proof of disability before its protections may be
sought.217 Unlike other civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination based on
invidious attitudes about protected traits, the ADA protects only a particular set of
people—specifically those with disabilities, as set out and defined under the statute.218
In contrast, under Title VII, a court would not likely spend time analyzing a plaintiff’s
relative skin color or religiosity; rather, it would focus primarily on the defendant’s
alleged conduct.219 The definition of “disability” thus serves a gatekeeping function
that is unique to ADA jurisprudence.220
Over the last fifteen years, federal courts have significantly limited the scope of the
ADA by whittling down the definition of disability. There are two reasons for the
tremendous amount of litigation over whether a plaintiff actually has a “disability.”221
First, it is easier to mount a successful defense against an ADA claim by arguing a
person is not disabled than by arguing the accommodation is not reasonable, presents
an undue hardship, or that the plaintiff is altogether unqualified.222 Second, courts
abhor vagueness and may be inclined to summarily agree that the plaintiff is not
disabled instead of rightly applying a flexible, individualized definition of disability.223
212. 42 § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
213. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
214. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
215. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 100.
216. The intense focus on impairment instead of the allegedly discriminatory conduct of the
employer is akin to the concerns about investigations and trials of rape and other sexual offense
charges—that the alleged victim is often on trial rather than the alleged perpetrator. Burgdorf,
supra note 208, at 561.
217. Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Definitions: Who is Disabled? Who is
Protected?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 87.
218. Id.
219. Burgdorf, supra note 208, at 560–61.
220. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 164 (“Acting as [medical] experts, [] judges and justices
have turned themselves into gatekeepers.”); Francis & Silvers, supra note 217, at 87.
221. E.g., Paul Steven Miller, The Definition of Disability in the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Its Successes and Shortcomings, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 473, 475 (2005).
222. Id.
223. See id.; O’B RIEN, supra note 41, at 164 (noting that “federal court judges and justices
have essentially said ‘enough,’ and limited statutory coverage under Title I”).
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Accordingly, employment discrimination cases under the ADA often fail at the
summary judgment stage since a claimant is often unable to prove herself disabled. As
noted earlier, this focus on the definitional bounds of disability is closely connected
with the medical model paradigm that interprets disability by focusing on the
impairment and ignoring social conditions.224 The result is that the social construct of
disability (and in this context, the potentially discriminatory motives of an employer)
is left unexamined.
Federal courts’ decisions regarding proof of disability have significantly weakened
the ADA,225 particularly with regard to the first prong of disability—actual disability.
Most scholars writing in this area have focused exclusively on the seminal, but sparse,
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.226 Accordingly, this Section primarily examines how
federal courts of appeals have addressed this issue within the last few years. First, this
Section examines how federal courts have made it difficult to be “disabled enough” to
garner the protections of the ADA. Second, this Section explains how just when
plaintiffs appear “disabled enough,” they have likely crossed into being “too disabled”
to be qualified individuals for their respective jobs. By being required to mount
evidence showing one is “really disabled,” the plaintiff may be inadvertently helping
the employer make its case that the plaintiff was not qualified for the job.
According to the ADA, “disability” with respect to an individual means “[a]
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual.”227 Broken out, actual disability contains three principle
requirements: first, there must be a physical or mental impairment; second, the
impairment must be substantially limiting; and last, the impairment must substantially
limit a major life activity. The “physical or mental impairment” requirement is rarely
an issue in ADA case law.228 The Supreme Court has established a broad scope for
impairment, finding that it covers illness and injuries resulting in physiological or
psychological change to the person.229 It is the second requirement—that the
impairment substantially limit a major life activity—that has garnered the majority of

224. See RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 13–14 (noting that the current approach to
disability is based on the medical model and categorizes people because of their supposedly
intrinsic limitations—“without reference to social context and socially imposed barriers”).
225. There is a consensus among most disability scholars that federal courts, and especially
the U.S. Supreme Court, are primarily responsible for the ADA’s inefficiency. See SUSAN
GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN
FEDERAL COURT 44 (2005) (concluding that Congress, federal agencies, plaintiffs, and attorneys
are not responsible for the ADA’s “constrained implementation”).
226. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002);
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999);
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2007).
228. PETER BLANCK, EVE HILL, CHARLES D. SIEGAL & MICHAEL WATERSTONE, DISABILITY
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY § 3.2(A) (2004).
229. Id. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1998) (construing
impairment broadly). Accordingly, the regulations have specified that a “physical impairment”
includes “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genitor-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2006).
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federal courts’ attention. Accordingly, the focus in this Part is on the substantiality
inquiry, as it is analytically separate from any identification of a major life activity.
In the below examination of cases in which employers have avoided liability under
the ADA, one might question if some of these plaintiffs would have been more
successful by bringing their claims under the “regarded as” prong of disability, instead
of “actual disability.” With regard to this possibility, there are a couple of points worth
noting. First, it is exceedingly difficult to prove—especially, after the fact—what an
employer believed about a person. A disabled person proceeding under the “regarded
as” prong of disability would have to show that the employer “regarded” her as
disabled; that is, the employer mistakenly believed she had an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.230 Moreover, it is not sufficient that the
employer believed that a worker had a generalized impairment; the plaintiff must
prove the employer specifically regarded the plaintiff’s disability as one that
substantially limits the plaintiff in one or more major life activities.231 To prove that
this particular construction existed in the “theoretical mind” of the employer is a
difficult task.232 The analytical difficulties discussed below regarding functionality and
mitigation are just as salient for a claim of disability discrimination brought under the
“regarded as” prong. In sum, bringing a suit under the “regarded as” prong involves all
of the problems of proving “actual disability”—in addition to the problems associated
with proving such a conception of disability existed in the “theoretical mind” of the
employer.
The general purpose of this examination is two-fold: first, to explain how a
medicalized view of disability currently informs federal court decisions interpreting
Title I; and second, to show how, as a result of this entrenchment, federal courts have
heavily restricted who is qualified to bring suit under the ADA.
1. “Not Disabled Enough” to Warrant the Protections of the ADA
Federal courts’ narrow construal of the definition of “disability” has made it
exceedingly difficult for individuals to be both “disabled” and “qualified” to bring
successful ADA lawsuits.233 The requirement that has contributed most heavily to this
dilemma has been the oftentimes ambiguous “substantially limits” requirement. An
individual is substantially limited in one of two scenarios: if she is unable to perform a
major life activity that the average person is able to perform, or if she is significantly
restricted as to the manner or duration under which she can perform a major life

230. Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1529 (2002).
231. Id. at 1530.
232. Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A
Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321,
328 (2003).
233. COLKER, supra note 84, at xiii; Hahn, supra note 140, at 187. Interestingly, this narrow
definition for what disability means is without legislative support. COLKER, supra note 84, at 65.
Both proponents and opponents of the ADA understood the definition of disability to have a
very broad scope. Id. To be sure, there were attempts to limit the definition of disability—for
example, by excluding individuals with contagious diseases or a history of drug abuse—but
none of these succeeded. Id. Though there were compromises to get the ADA passed, the
definition of disability was not a source of great compromise. Id.
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activity when compared with the average person.234 It is very difficult to predict when
a particular person will meet this requirement.
For example, the Tenth Circuit recently held that a woman with cerebral palsy—
who had difficulty with speech, preparing food, eating, swallowing, dressing herself,
and certain manual tasks that related to personal hygiene—was not disabled.235 The
plaintiff sued her employer claiming it had unlawfully terminated her because she had
a disability.236 This was a suit brought by a woman who, by all appearances, was
substantially limited in her performance of major life activities when compared with
the average person. Yet, the court found her effectively “not disabled enough.”237
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has stated that “the term
‘substantial’ must ‘be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled.’”238 It then quickly reiterated that to meet the ADA’s definition of
“disabled” a plaintiff must satisfy a “demanding standard.”239 The court next applied a
technical and demanding analysis to conclude that no rational jury could find Holt was
substantially limited in any major life activity.240 Holt was found not disabled despite
her full array of apparent limitations.
As noted above, plaintiffs are often found not disabled because of comparisons with
“the average person” under the “substantially limits” definition. The key to this
“average person” litmus test is an individualized inquiry, whereby the focus is on how
the impairment affects the particular plaintiff.241 Thus, someone with diabetes may be
found, under an individualized assessment, not disabled, while another diabetic may
well be considered disabled under the ADA. An individualized inquiry quite naturally
leads to different results for individuals with the same impairment.242 The result is that
there is little predictability in examining particular disabilities.

234. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)−(ii) (2003).
235. See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2006).
236. Id. at 763.
237. See id. at 767.
238. Id. at 766 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 767.
241. Positively, this view appears to recognize parts of the social construction of disability—
that disability is not simply a physiological condition, but consists in the interplay between a
person and her surrounding environment.
242. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.2(B)(1). For example, diabetes, depending on its
individual effects, may well constitute a substantially life-limiting condition. See, e.g., Nawrot v.
CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that plaintiff’s diabetes severely
limited his ability to think and care for himself); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916,
926 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff’s ailments, preceded by his diabetes, limited the major life
activity of eating). Conversely, other courts within the same jurisdiction may find that the effects
of a condition—such as diabetes—do not substantially limit a major life activity. See, e.g.,
Raffaele v. City of N.Y., No. 00-CV-3837, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17786 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 2004) (finding that the limitations of the plaintiff related to diabetes are certainly inconvenient
and troublesome but do not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity); see also
Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[A] diabetic is not per se
disabled but must demonstrate his condition substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999))). Thus, very few
conditions could be said to constitute disability per se, or necessarily afford individuals
protection under the ADA.
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Though such a test may seem intuitively acceptable—that is, that not all people
with the same type of disability should be considered disabled—consider the point that
having a milder form of disability may not make discrimination any less likely. For
example, someone with a very mild case of diabetes likely still requires
accommodation and may still engender certain stereotypes, making this person
susceptible to discrimination.243 However, this person—assuming she were unable to
meet the definition for “actual disability,” as interpreted by the federal judiciary—
would have no standing to challenge even outright discrimination on the basis of her
diabetes. Interestingly, the drafters of the ADA did not foresee this degree of
individualized assessment.244 While the drafters of the ADA anticipated that an
individualized inquiry would be used to determine if someone was qualified to do the
job, it was not intended that one person with epilepsy might be covered by the ADA,
but another, not covered.245
Although the individualized assessment recognizes that disability is dynamic and
takes into account some of the social dimension of disability, much of the medical
model’s entrenchment remains. First, “[t]he Court’s restrictive category of disability
‘reflects and reinforces the notion that disability is an objective biomedical
phenomenon that constitutes an essential aspect of the individual.’”246 The
restrictiveness of the definition of disability is illustrated more fully below. Second,
the medical model is entrenched through the judicial system’s insistence that people
with disabilities prove themselves disabled.247 Disabled persons must prove that they
are truly “different” from those without disabilities, or “disabled enough” to deserve
the protection of the ADA.248 Such a view reinforces the idea that being disabled
means someone is abnormal, or worse, “special.” Finally, disability has been prone to
a medicalized and socially-abstracted examination since the bench generally “does not
. . . understand the social and historical context of the disability experience.”249

243. See infra notes 299–308 and accompanying text (discussing Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002)).
244. Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91,
151–52 (1999).
245. Id. at 152.
246. Pendo, supra note 22, at 1195; see also RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 12; Anita
Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of Antidiscrimination Law, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE L AW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 128 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has wrongly clung to
the “common idea” that “disability is fixed to defective biological states, and that overcoming
such defects disposes of disability”).
247. Robert Burgdorf has identified the judiciary’s focus on technical obstacles to disability
protection as part of “the protected class mentality” and explained that it may be due to the fact
that people with disabilities have historically been viewed as objects of pity and charity. See
Burgdorf, supra note 208, at 568. He notes that though the protected-class approach may have a
place in some areas (such as providing special services and benefits to citizens with disabilities),
it has no place in the area of prohibiting discrimination. Id. In his words, “[n]ondiscrimination is
a guarantee of equality. It is not a special service reserved for a select few.” Id.
248. Bagenstos, supra note 133, at 659.
249. Miller, supra note 221, at 475; see also O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 168 (arguing the
Supreme Court has perceived that physical and mental impairments—and not prejudicial
attitudes—are what limit disabled people’s workplace opportunities).
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a. Functional Disability: Asking the Wrong Questions
The federal courts’ approach to substantial limitation has been a functional one that
is determined by a comparison to what an average person in the general population is
able to do.250 Accordingly, whether a person is substantially limited is a distinct and
individualized inquiry that considers not only a particular plaintiff’s limitations, but
also her advantages. Such an individualized inquiry could potentially constitute a
sophisticated and sensitive approach.251 In reality, however, federal courts have used
this case-by-case assessment as a means of “scrutinizing the personal, societal,
medical, and technological ways that someone has to mitigate their condition.”252 The
result has been one sided; persons with significant physical disabilities are typically
found “not disabled enough.”253 To reach this conclusion, a court will typically note
how capable the disabled individual is in various activities and/or how incompetent the
average person is by comparison.254 This means “[a] person with a debilitating
impairment with more education than the ‘average person,’ like a pharmacist,” may
very well be considered not disabled enough.255 In other words, courts examine how a
person functions generally and essentially compare disabled people with “normal”
ones.256
This holistic assessment translates into courts inventing proxies for lack of
disability, such as worldly success or education.257 Unbelievably, the proxy has
sometimes been success with one’s particular job; in these situations, disabled persons
will lose coverage under the ADA through their ongoing efforts to be “qualified” for
their particular job (also a requirement under the ADA). A functional view of
disability can thus obscure the inquiry concerning an employer’s discriminatory
motives.
For example, one person may have a severe disability and encounter discrimination
based largely on stereotypes associated with it. Yet, this same person may be so
educated that he is able to perform the major life activities typically impaired by his
disability at the level of an average person. Because the technical requirements for
disability are not met, this plaintiff’s case would probably be dismissed at summary
judgment, without the court ever considering the discriminatory animus of the
employer. In this example, even though discrimination is occurring, discriminatory
motives get lost in the confusion over comparisons to the average person.258 In this

250. See O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 10 (noting this point of reference incites federal courts
to “make normalizing judgments”); O’Brien, supra note 1, at 49.
251. Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213,
1230 (2003).
252. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 16.
253. See DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 11; Hoffman, supra note 251, at 1230
(arguing the individualized assessment mandate “makes the ADA’s definition of disability
unworkable, and therefore, must be abandoned”).
254. DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 11.
255. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 50.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 41 (citing Thalos v. Dillon Cos., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Colo. 2000)).
258. Paul Miller, former Commissioner of the EEOC, has observed just this phenomenon. He
notes,
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context, the functionality query is just another way that the medical model of disability
is transmitted and disability’s social meaning ignored.259
In February of 2006, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who had “learned
successfully to live with his [disability]” was not disabled enough to merit reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.260 The plaintiff, James Lawson Carr, had a cancerous
tumor as a child in his right arm that required the replacement of his right humerus
with a cadaver bone supported by a metal rod and pins.261 Years later, while working
as a cashier for Publix Super Markets, Carr began to experience a sharp, persistent
pain in his upper right arm.262 As a general cashier, Carr would often have to lift heavy
items, such as bags of charcoal or dog food.263 Accordingly, his doctor soon advised
against repetitive lifting activities with his right arm.264 Carr thus requested an
alternative assignment to a position that required less lifting—such as an Office
Cashier, Deli Cashier, or Pharmacy Clerk.265 Despite these positions becoming
available, Publix never accommodated Carr’s request.266 Carr eventually quit his job
because of the pain and brought suit under the ADA.267
The Eleventh Circuit noted that by his own account and “to Carr’s credit, Carr has
learned successfully to live with his impaired arm in a manner that little restricts his
major activities.”268 The court also noted Carr’s testimony that he is able to care for
himself without assistance and that he has “pretty good” use of his right hand.269 The
Eleventh Circuit employed a functional view of disability and thus concluded that no
disability had been shown for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case under the
ADA.270 From the record, it was clear that Carr had experienced significant pain with
his current job and requested what appeared to be reasonable accommodation. Still,
because of the court’s approach to defining disability—one that was altogether
removed from the context of working—he was found not disabled enough. Carr had

[E]ven if one lost a job, or was not hired, because of a disability, if the plaintiff
demonstrates that he or she is able enough to function regardless of that disability,
he or she is not protected by the ADA even though the disability was the reason
for the discrimination . . . . The court never gets to test the disability pretext for the
adverse action because the plaintiff is not disabled.
Miller, supra note 221, at 475.
259. See RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 109.
260. Carr v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., No. 05-12611, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2845, at *7
(11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2006).
261. Id. at *1.
262. Id. at *2.
263. Id. at *2–*3.
264. Id. at *2.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *2–*3.
267. Id. at *1–*3.
268. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). Such a position has been parroted in lower court decisions.
For example, in Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, the district court held that a genetic
amputee, born with only one functioning arm was not disabled and not covered by the ADA.
238 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (concluding she was not eligible for coverage under the ADA
based largely on her testimony that she was able to do everything required by the job and her
general optimism toward challenging tasks).
269. Carr, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2845, at *7.
270. Id.
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learned to live with his disability and hold a productive job in the marketplace. As a
counterintuitive result, he would not receive any protection from the courts.
The most significant result of this functional view of substantial limitation is that
federal judges dismiss eighty percent of ADA cases at the summary judgment stage.271
The primary reason judges give for dismissing these suits is that the plaintiff has an
impairment that is not substantially limiting. These plaintiffs are simply “not disabled
enough.”272 On the flip side, the second most common reason for an ADA case
dismissal is the decision that a plaintiff is not qualified to perform her job—these
plaintiffs are “too disabled.”273 The tension between these two dynamics creates an
obvious loophole for employers who decide they simply do not want employees with
physical and mental impairments in their workplace. When these types of cases are
dismissed at summary judgment, the question of how a company has been acting in
demoting, firing, or refusing to provide reasonable accommodation is never examined.
By attempting to limit the ADA to the “truly disabled,” federal courts continue to treat
disability as a biological phenomenon.274 The result of this approach is that most of the
time—notwithstanding any potential discriminatory animus—an employer is going to
be safe.275
In May of 2006, the Third Circuit found that a plaintiff’s success in his job
supported the conclusion that he was not disabled under the ADA.276 The plaintiff, a
teacher named Charles Weisberg, sued the school district for failing to provide
reasonable accommodation under Title I of the ADA.277 Weisberg was injured at work
when a large wooden speaker fell off the wall behind him and struck him in the back,
shoulder, neck, and head.278 Since the time of injury, Weisberg was diagnosed with
“concussive brain injury” and had difficulty with his ability to concentrate.279 In
addition, the court noted his abnormal fatigue, slowness in carrying out tasks, and loss
of memory.280 But Weisberg could not have his request for accommodation even
evaluated because the court decided he was not disabled enough.281 To reach this

271. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 100 (citing Ruth Colker, The ADA: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999)). Interestingly, empirical studies have verified that the
ADA fairs considerably worse than its closest statutory analogue, Title VII. See COLKER, supra
note 84, at 83–85.
272. See O’Brien, supra note 1, at 100.
273. Id.
274. Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court’s Nearsighted View of the
ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51, at 125.
275. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 100 n.13 (citing Colker, supra note 271). Colker has since
qualified these numbers as not completely accurate. Nevertheless, she has recently reiterated on
the basis of more recent empirical work that plaintiffs “fare very poorly before judges at the
summary judgment stage.” COLKER, supra note 84, at 71 (emphasis added). The effective result
is that “the employer is free to act on every bigoted and irrational impulse that it may have
toward a particular disability.” Mayerson & Diller, supra note 274, at 124.
276. Weisberg v. Riverside Twp. BOE, No. 04-4533, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11800, at *21
(3d Cir. May 11, 2006).
277. Id. at *1–*2.
278. Id. at *4.
279. Id. at *4–*5.
280. Id. at *5.
281. See id. at *3 (observing that the district court did not reach the question of whether
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conclusion, the court noted several times, as evidence that he was not disabled, that
Weisberg had been able to do his job well.282 Accordingly, Weisberg was disqualified
from the ADA’s protections in part by his efforts to do his job well. However, under
the ADA, he needed to be “qualified” for his job to bring suit. Such a case illustrates
the tension between being functionally disabled and yet qualified enough to justify the
ADA’s protections.
A functional test becomes even more complicated when one begins to consider the
many reasons why someone may or may not be able to perform a major life activity at
the level of an average person. One of those reasons is the issue of mitigation.
b. To Mitigate or Not: That is the Question
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. that the ADA
protects only individuals who are substantially limited in one or more major life
activities after any mitigating measures have been taken into account.283 This holding
presents an even more cumbersome version of the Goldilocks dilemma. If a potential
employee has mitigated her disability too much, the Court will likely find that, under
an individualized inquiry, she is “not disabled enough”; mitigation will often put a
person on par with the average person for performing major life activities.284 On the
other hand, if a potential employee has not mitigated her condition, she will likely be
found “too disabled” to be qualified for the job, or she will require accommodation
that would be an “undue hardship” for the employer. The practical reality is that the
mitigating measure that a disabled person uses to be qualified often renders her nondisabled.285 And someone who does not bother to mitigate her condition will likely not
even be found qualified for the job she is seeking.286
Hence, here lies the dilemma: employees must mitigate their natural disability to be
considered “qualified” and yet if they do this, they decrease the likelihood that they
will be able to utilize the protections of the ADA. It becomes a catch-22 for disabled
workers to try and help themselves.287 Justice Stevens has called this result
“counterintuitive”—that “the ADA’s safeguards vanish when individuals make
themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome their physical or

Weisberg suffered an adverse employment decision).
282. Id. (“The District Court reviewed the evidence showing the many activities Weisberg is
capable of doing: ‘Weisberg has acknowledged that he has been able to do his job and to do it
well.’”); id. at *6 (“Despite . . . difficulties at work, Weisberg testified that he is able to do his
job well.”).
283. See generally Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
284. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 100. Yet being able to perform major life activities at the level
of an average person does not make one any less susceptible to discrimination based on
stereotypes about the disabled.
285. COLKER, supra note 84, at 2.
286. See id.
287. To be fair, the following must be acknowledged: people who argue their impairment
substantially limits them in some major life activity other than work may not face any catch-22.
For example, there is nothing inconsistent with arguing that an impairment substantially limits a
person’s mobility, but that she can perform the essential functions of a job with reasonable
accommodation—such as a first-floor office with wide doorways to accommodate a wheelchair.
McGowan, supra note 67, at 104.
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mental limitations.”288 Moreover, stereotypes and animus toward people with
disabilities do not disappear merely because a person learns to ameliorate her
condition. The potential for such a person to experience discrimination is just as real,
because disability discrimination is often not rational. The ultimate result is that it
simply is not clear how to be disabled “just right.” What is the “right” degree of
disability for those seeking protection under the ADA?
Three opinions issued at the same time by the U.S. Supreme Court elucidate the
current approach. All three of these, Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,289 Murphy v.
UPS,290 and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,291 involved plaintiffs who, because they
mitigated their disabilities, were held not to be covered by the ADA. In Sutton, the
Court provided its full rationale for this mitigation principle. The plaintiffs in Sutton
were twin sisters with uncorrected vision that was worse than 20/200.292 However,
both sisters wore corrective lenses that made their vision 20/20 or better.293 They each
applied for employment as commercial airline pilots with United.294 Though invited
for interviews, each sister was told at her interview there had been a mistake since the
sisters did not meet United’s minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected
visual acuity of 20/100 or better.295 The sisters filed suit under Title I of the ADA,
claiming discrimination on the basis of disability.296 The Court held the determination
of whether someone is disabled ought to be made with reference to measures that
mitigate the individual’s impairment. The plaintiffs’ eyeglasses and contact lenses
could not be ignored in assessing whether the sisters were truly disabled, and the Court
held the sisters did not satisfy the threshold consideration of being disabled.297
The scope of Sutton cannot be ignored. Its ruling excludes a vast number of
potential plaintiffs from coverage under the ADA.298 By focusing on the definitional
bounds of disability (essentially, the medical model of disability) to the exclusion of
discrimination (at the core of the social model of disability), these holdings produce
counterintuitive results. In Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff, Stephen Orr, had
diabetes and required a strict regimen to control its effects.299 In 1998, Orr took a job
as a pharmacist with Wal-Mart with the understanding that he would be able to take
breaks throughout the day to manage his diabetes.300 Within a few months, however,

288. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
290. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
291. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
292. Id. at 475.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 476.
296. Id.
297. The Court also held the sisters were not “regarded as” disabled since the employer did
not regard the sisters as being substantially limited in their performance of major life activities.
Id. at 489–90. The employer simply had a facially discriminatory policy—not necessarily a
discriminatory perception.
298. See DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 10 (observing that the ruling in Sutton
“erased protections for millions of persons with stabilized diabetes, seizure disorders, heart
disease, and psychiatric conditions”).
299. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2002).
300. Id.
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Orr inherited a new manager who reprimanded him for taking a half-hour off for lunch
to administer his medication and eat his lunch uninterrupted, which was necessary to
avoid hypoglycemic episodes.301 Orr initially changed his schedule as the new
manager demanded, but soon found it impossible to manage his diabetes effectively.302
He protested his manager’s decision and was terminated.303
In keeping with Sutton, the Eighth Circuit’s discussion centered on whether Orr
was “disabled enough” to enjoy the protections of the ADA. The court noted that, with
Orr’s mitigating measures, his diabetes did not place substantial limitations on his
ability to work.304 However, this judgment was made with regard to the time during
which Wal-Mart had made accommodation for Orr’s diabetes. Though Orr’s concern
was for how his diabetes would develop in the future without proper accommodation,
the Eighth Circuit refused to consider what would or could occur in the future if Orr
did not have proper accommodation and failed to treat his diabetes.305 Thus, Orr could
neither gain standing to demand accommodation, nor could he fight to get his job
back. The court affirmed summary judgment against his claim.306
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Lay observed that Orr had experienced seizures,
deteriorated vision, and slurred speech in the past because of his diabetes.307 Lay
claimed these results were not merely what could occur, but rather what had actually
happened when Orr was unable to follow a rigid discipline of eating at a scheduled
time.308 Accordingly, the effect of Sutton’s application in Orr was to exclude someone
with a serious history of diabetes from being able to insist on reasonable
accommodation. Orr was simply not disabled enough.
The result in Orr is now commonplace. Other federal courts have used the
definition of disability with regard to mitigating measures to conclude that individuals
with heart conditions,309 blood cancer,310 hypertension,311 hearing impairments, severe
depression,312 mental illness, diabetes,313 asthma,314 and epilepsy 315 are not disabled.
Defense lawyers have even argued that individuals born with a deformed limb are not
disabled under the ADA.316

301. Id.
302. Id. at 723.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 725.
305. Id. at 724.
306. Id. at 722.
307. Id. at 726 (Lay, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. See Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2000).
310. E.g., EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that
plaintiff was not substantially limited for consideration of actual disability, but remanding on
“record of” and “regarded as” prongs).
311. E.g., Hill v. Kan. Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 891 (8th Cir. 1999).
312. E.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999).
313. E.g., Nordwall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 46 F. App’x 364, 364 (7th Cir. 2002).
314. E.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 298 (2d Cir. 1999).
315. E.g., Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Co., 250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Sara
Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 349 (4th Cir. 2001).
316. COLKER, supra note 84, at 106.
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Because such cases are dismissed on the threshold issue of coverage, the question
of whether discrimination actually occurred is never addressed.317 These cases are also
a window into the power given to employers, who can simultaneously claim the
individual is too disabled to work for them but not disabled enough to be protected
under the ADA.318 Under Sutton, an employer could explicitly refuse to hire an
individual because of an impairment, such as diabetes, but then escape liability by
arguing that the impairment does not constitute a disability under the ADA.319
Accordingly, an employer’s discriminatory motives seem to largely drop out of the
Title I equation, and the catch-22 rears its head once again as individuals can be
considered too impaired to work but not impaired enough to be protected from
discrimination. The result is that plaintiffs with disabilities that are mitigated by any
measure are often ruled out on summary judgment.320
Some courts have narrowed the scope of who can proceed under the ADA even
further by manipulating the concept of mitigation. For example, though most courts
have assessed impairments and actual mitigation at the time of the alleged
discrimination, some courts have considered mitigation subsequent to the alleged
discrimination as evidence that the impairment was temporary.321 Others have
considered a lack of mitigation when they believed the plaintiff stopped the mitigating
measure without a compelling reason.322 One wonders if the next step is for courts to
consider a lack of mitigation when they simply believe the plaintiff should be
successfully mitigating her impairment.323
If a person is discriminated against because of a latent disability, but is no longer
disabled by the use of a mitigating measure, could she not bring her claim of
discrimination under the “record of a disability” prong? At least one scholar has noted

317. DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 2−3.
318. Id.
319. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.2(B)(2).
320. Id. (citing as examples: Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir.
2001); Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F.3d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 2001); Spades v. City of Walnut
Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999); Anyan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp.2d 228, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Sepulveda v. Glickman, 167 F. Supp.2d 186, 191 (D. P.R. 2001); Arnold v.
City of Appleton, Wis., 97 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Robb v. Horizon Credit
Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 1999)).
321. Id. (citing, as an example, Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F. 3d 307, 316 (6th Cir.
2001)).
322. Id. (citing Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2000) and
Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff’d by unpublished
opinion, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000)).
323. Indeed, in Tangires, the plaintiff with severe asthma did not take steroidal medication
prescribed by doctor because she feared adverse effects on her pituitary gland. The court held
that because her condition could have been effectively mitigated by medication, she was not
disabled under the ADA. Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 587. Similarly, in Hein, a truck driver with
hypertension refused to drive a delivery run because he was unable to obtain his medication
prior to the trip. The court held he was not disabled because his condition should be viewed in
its mitigated state since he voluntarily failed to take his medication. Interestingly, in this case,
the driver was discriminated against particularly in his unmitigated state. Yet the court
considered his ability to mitigate and found him not disabled. Hein, 232 F.3d at 482.
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that it is unlikely courts will allow the second prong of disability to effectively
overturn Sutton’s mitigating-measures ruling.324
In the dissent of Sutton, Justice Stevens briefly broached this issue. Addressing the
interplay between actual disability and record of a disability, he observed that the
Court’s opinion appears to “hold[] that one who continues to wear a hearing aid that
she has worn all her life might not be covered—fully cured impairments are covered,
but merely treatable ones are not.”325 He then questioned whether the text of the ADA
could possibly require such a bizarre result.326 Ruth Colker has added some questions
of her own:
And what about a person who is born deaf but has a cochlear implant? Does that
person have a ‘record of’ deafness or, like the person who uses a hearing aid, is he
or she simply someone who is using a mitigating measure and thereby not covered
by the statute? What does it mean to be ‘fully cured’? So far, the courts have
offered little useful guidance on these questions.327

In sum, the measure of substantial limitation by federal courts has been a curious
thing. Courts have found that medical equipment, medicine, education, or one’s
lifestyle can militate against the conclusion that one is truly disabled.328 In any event,
the result is that those who attempt to mitigate their impairment, overcome their
obstacles, and succeed, receive little protection under the ADA. As Justice Stevens has
noted, the “ironic” effect is that the Supreme Court’s interpretation denies “protection
for persons with substantially limiting impairments that, when corrected, render them
fully able and employable.”329
c. How Long Must the Disability Last?
Another aspect of disability that has operated to exclude potential claimants is the
length of the impairment. The Supreme Court provided seeming clarity for the issue of
length in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams by holding that in
order for a disability to be “substantially limiting” it must be “permanent or long
term.”330 Yet this definition leaves matters unclear. The ADA is certainly not a
medical leave act, but when does a short-term medical issue cross the line and
constitute a long term or permanent disability?331 The ADA provides no guidance, nor
has the Supreme Court ruled explicitly about what amount of time would cross the
“long term” threshold.332 Is one year of an enfeebling sickness enough? What about

324. See COLKER, supra note 84, at 109.
325. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
326. Id.
327. COLKER, supra note 84, at 109.
328. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 556 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 516 (1999); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
329. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 510.
330. 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
331. This question arose in a recent First Circuit case. See Guzman-Rosario v. UPS, No. 041046, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1730, *1, *7 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2005).
332. Id. at *9.
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eight months of a crippling condition? As the First Circuit has recently noted, “[u]ntil
the Supreme Court fine-tunes its interpretation, it will be unclear how lower courts
should deal with periods between, say, six and twenty-four months.”333 Thus far, lower
courts’ applications of a duration limitation have excluded a surprising variety of
conditions from the ADA’s purported scope, including breast cancer that necessitates
radiation treatment,334 arthritis that hampers one’s ability to walk,335 and severe
abdominal pain that necessitates stomach surgery.336
Notably, the language of the ADA as proposed and as enacted never contained any
limitation or exclusion for those with “temporary” or “short-term” disabilities.337 Nor
did the legislative history of the ADA provide support for such a conclusion.338 It is
even more perplexing to examine the practical effects of such an approach. For
example, it is difficult to understand why an employer is permitted to fire a person if a
temporary disability will cause the worker to miss some work, but not permitted to fire
a person if the condition will force the worker to be out of work for a much longer
period of time.339 Given the purpose of the ADA, this seems to be a distinction without
a difference. After all, why should any qualified individual with a disability (no matter
the length) be precluded from recourse against discrimination on the basis of
disability?
2. “Too Disabled” to be a “Qualified Individual” for the Job
A disabled individual must also be a “qualified individual” to warrant the
protections of Title I of the ADA.340 Thus, in those instances where the plaintiff is able
to produce adequate evidence to establish the existence of a disability that substantially
limits a major life activity, the employer will often use this same evidence to support
its claim that the plaintiff is not qualified for the position in question.341 Former
Commissioner of the EEOC Paul Miller has said that plaintiffs are “forced to prove
themselves out of the ADA’s protection” because of this dilemma.342 For example, in
Breitfelder v. Leis,343 the plaintiff sustained an injury that caused him to experience
extreme pain in his neck and decreased mobility in his left arm.344 The plaintiff worked
for the Sheriff’s Department and, following the injury, requested a transfer to a

333. Id.
334. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 62−63 (citing Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,
85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996)).
335. Id. (citing Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1995)).
336. Id. (citing McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995)).
337. Id. at 61.
338. Burgdorf, supra note 208, at 474.
339. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 62.
340. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2007).
341. DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 2–3; see also Coleman v. Keystone Freight
Corp., No. 04-2884, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15734, *1, *7 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (agreeing
with the district court’s holding that plaintiff’s evidence pertaining to drug therapy supported the
conclusion that plaintiff was not qualified for his desired job).
342. Miller, supra note 221, at 476.
343. No. 04-4364, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 21821, *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2005).
344. Id. at *2–*3.
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sedentary or light duty job.345 The Department denied this request and the plaintiff
sued the Department for employment discrimination.346
Despite the sheriff’s stated concern that the plaintiff was faking his disability, the
Court concluded the plaintiff was a disabled person under the ADA.347 However, the
district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was not qualified for the
job he desired.348 This is a typical example of how an employer is able to make
contradictory—and opportunistic—assertions.349 In Breitfelder, the sheriff could claim
the employee was faking his disability. Yet he also could simultaneously argue that the
plaintiff was too disabled to be qualified for the particular job.
The “reasonable accommodation” provision may help explain how a plaintiff will
often be considered too disabled to be a qualified individual for the job. In Breitfelder,
the plaintiff partly argued his case of discrimination by pointing to pertinent
accommodations that were afforded other employees.350 Still, the Sixth Circuit noted
that even if the plaintiff could have performed the essential tasks of a sedentary
position with reasonable accommodation, it was his burden to suggest such
accommodation.351 The court concluded, “[s]ince he did not request to be
accommodated in the same manner [as other coworkers], defendants did not fail to
accommodate him.”352 Here again, the potentially discriminatory motives of an
employer are ignored.
Moreover in a situation like Breitfelder, courts coolly ignore the social implications
of disability; in fact, given the cultural hostility toward disability, plaintiffs will often
be reluctant to request reasonable accommodation.353 This reluctance is a complicated
dynamic. First, as noted above, disabled individuals have been taught to overcome

345. Id. at *3.
346. Id. at *1.
347. Id. at *6, *14.
348. Id. at *14–*16.
349. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text (explaining how under the present law
an employer may explicitly refuse to hire an individual because of an impairment, but then
escape liability by arguing the impairment is not a disability under the ADA).
350. Breitfelder, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 21821, at *20.
351. See id. at *16–*20 (concluding that if there was a failure to suggest a reasonable
accommodation, “Breitfelder bears a significant amount of the responsibility for the break . . . .
[R]ather than ask Sheriff Leis to make . . . accommodations for him, Breitfelder remained
silent”).
352. Id. at *20.
353. See ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 148, at 244–45, 251 (2003) (explaining the various
reasons disabled individuals are often reluctant to assert disability rights in the workplace).
Professor Hahn, founder and director of the Program in Disability and Society at the University
of Southern California, has explained this dilemma well:
In a society where so many taken-for-granted facets of the environment favor their
nondisabled peers, most disabled individuals have been socialized to believe that
they can only compete on equal terms by relentless striving through
overcompensation, or, in the nomenclature of the disability community, by
becoming “supercrips.” They have not been encouraged to request reasonable
accommodations, and many have found it difficult to initiate legal action on the
basis of a physical trait that they have been taught to “overcome.”
Hahn, supra note 140, at 181.
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their disabilities through their own courageous efforts—to become supercrips.354
Second, many with disabilities have publicly refused to identify themselves as
disabled, citing their desire to be evaluated in absolute terms.355 For example, the
famous astrophysicist Stephen Hawking expressed his desire to be judged on such
terms and snubbed “special” activities like the Paralympics.356 Such comments are
typical of the cultural pressure disabled individuals have encountered to assimilate and
work without special assistance. Accordingly, many potential cases are likely never
brought because the employee simply caved when she was told she was not qualified
for the job.
This illustrates the tightrope a plaintiff must walk to prove that she is both disabled
and qualified. She must emphasize all the things she cannot do in order to claim ADA
protection, while at the same time downplaying certain limitations to prove she is
qualified for the job.357 A plaintiff’s case is rarely “just right.”
Quite a few scholars have suggested changes to the ADA, but the ADA Restoration
Act, introduced in July of 2007, has yet to receive much scholarly examination. With
all of the recent case law constricting the ADA’s scope of inclusion, it seems
appropriate to rewrite the ADA’s definition of disability and restore civil rights
protections to those with disabilities.358
II. RESTORING THE ADA: A RETURN TO THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
Given the extraordinary entrenchment of the medical model of disability and
the myriad ways in which the model affects everything from social policy,
legislation, judicial decisions, and individual and societal perceptions about
disability, those who seek to change the status quo face a daunting task . . . .359

One might question how Congress drafted a disability statute that fails to provide
effective recourse for the very people who consider themselves disabled. The answer
lies in a bit of history. Before the ADA, there was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.360
This Act offered a national program of vocational rehabilitation for those considered
handicapped. Under the statute, a handicap was “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual,” a
“record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.”361
Interestingly, courts rarely reviewed the definitional language of this statute.362 The
definition was understood to include any nontrivial medical condition and courts

354. See ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 148, at 21–30, 239 (2003) (discussing the life
narrative of Sara Lane, a newspaper reporter with polio, who fears that asserting her legal rights
under disability law might undermine her professional identity and jeopardize future
opportunities for reporters with disabilities); Hahn, supra note 140, at 181; see also supra notes
42–47, 189, and accompanying text.
355. RILEY, supra note 17, at 19.
356. Id.
357. Mayerson & Diller, supra note 274, at 124.
358. DEFINING DISABILITY, supra note 52, at 3.
359. Rovner, supra note 22, at 1095.
360. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1998)).
361. Feldblum, supra note 244, at 91.
362. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.1 (2004).
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applied the law’s coverage in that manner.363 For example, in 1984—over ten years
after the Rehabilitation Act’s definition for handicap had been in effect—one federal
district court noted that it was aware of only one decision where a court had decided a
plaintiff was not handicapped.364
Thus, when disability advocates decided the Rehabilitation Act did not go far
enough (since it did not apply to the private sector)365 and began to champion the
ADA, Congress decided to copy its definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act.
Congress’s intent was to extend the Rehabilitation Act to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of handicap by private companies, as well as entities that received federal
funds.366 In short, “Congress felt comfortable relying on a definition that had fifteen
years of experience behind it. And disability rights advocates felt comfortable that the
same individuals, with the wide range of impairments, who had been covered under
existing disability anti-discrimination law, would be covered under the ADA.”367
The federal courts’ current fixation on whether a person is “disabled enough” is
thus entirely unprecedented. Before passage of the ADA, disability was handled much
more in accordance with other types of discrimination. Just as courts hearing
employment discrimination cases under Title VII never analyzed whether the plaintiff
was truly a woman or entirely Muslim, courts hearing Rehabilitation Act cases “rarely
tarried long on the question of whether a plaintiff was ‘really a handicapped
individual.’”368 Instead, as with Title VII, courts analyzing cases under the
Rehabilitation Act focused on whether the plaintiff had proven the alleged
discriminatory action was taken because of her handicap.369 Moreover, Congress spent

363. Feldblum, supra note 244, at 91–92.
364. Tudyman v. United Airlines, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
365. Though Title V of the Rehabilitation Act barred discrimination against handicapped
individuals by programs that received federal funds, others thought this bar should extend to the
private sector. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 14 (observing lobbyists’ argument that the ADA
would merely be an extension of Title V, which “has caused no one any trouble”).
366. Feldblum, supra note 244, at 92 (observing that “one of the best ‘selling points’ of the
ADA was that Congress would simply be extending to the private sector the requirements of an
existing law”). As one commentator has clarified, however, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act
was rarely enforced. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 14.
367. Feldblum, supra note 244, at 92. Feldblum illuminates the mindset of those who were
drafting the ADA: “Why use a new definition of disability in the ADA? Why not use the
definition of ‘handicap’ that the courts had been applying for years under sections 501, 503, and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” Id. at 91; see also Crossley, supra note 18, at 635 (citing
congressional reports as proof that the ADA was intended to be interpreted consistently with
section 504’s language). “[A]dvocates lobbying for the ADA believed any individual with a
serious illness or with a non-trivial impairment would be covered.” BLANCK ET AL., supra note
228, at § 3.1 (citing Feldblum, supra note 244, at 156–57).
368. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.1. Some might respond that disability
discrimination is altogether different than other forms of discrimination. Indeed, one common
way to try and differentiate the two types of discrimination has been to claim that people against
disability rights are so because of economic incentives, and not because of any felt animus
toward the disabled. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 176 (observing that to many, disability has not
been seen as the Jim Crow South, since allegedly, no animus is involved). As seemingly
persuasive as this might sound, there has historically been a thin line between economic
justifications and discriminatory motives.
369. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.1.
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a great deal of time and words clarifying what constituted a disability prior to passage
of the ADA.370 The idea, for example, of medication or assistive devices mitigating a
condition, such that it would no longer constitute a disability, “had been discussed and
dismissed by Congress.”371
However, courts applying the ADA have ignored discrimination and instead
focused on the limits of the protected class.372 The ironic result is that even though the
ADA was a statute intended to expand the existing protections for disabled
individuals,373 the present focus on the definitional bounds of disability has minimized
the ADA’s scope of protection in the employment sector.374
A. The ADA Restoration Act: Escaping the Goldilocks Dilemma
The legislation recently introduced in July of 2007, the ADA Restoration Act,
provides an excellent guidepost for a legislative overhaul of the ADA. The bill—which
is based on the National Council on Disability’s recommendations—would change the
current focus of Title I from whether someone is disabled to whether that person
experienced discrimination that has as its basis disability. It is without dispute that
preventing disability discrimination was the ultimate goal of the ADA. In this context,
the essence of the ADA Restoration Act is not some new rendition of the ADA, but
rather, a return to the broad interpretation Congress originally intended for the
statute.375 Without addressing every change provided by the ADA Restoration Act, this
Section will identify and explain a few of the provisions that would eliminate disabled
plaintiffs’ current dilemma under Title I of the ADA.
First, this bill proposes that references in the statute to discrimination “against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual” be
replaced by references to simply discrimination “against an individual on the basis of
disability.”376 This relatively subtle change accords with the general treatment of
discrimination under other statutes. Title VII uses similar language to prohibit
discrimination “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.”377
Shifting the focus to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability would create
the presumption that an individual is a member of the protected class if they allege

370. O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 164.
371. Id.
372. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 228, at § 3.1.
373. The ADA not only expanded the types of entities that would be responsible to follow its
mandates, but it also expanded the substantive nature of the protections provided for disabled
individuals by: 1) addressing the need for reasonable accommodations; 2) prohibiting the
segregation of people with disabilities into separate programs; and 3) prohibiting the use of
criteria (or proxies) to screen out those with disabilities. Crossley, supra note 18, at 621–22.
374. See supra Part I.
375. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 12, 101–02. The ADA Restoration Act explicitly
states that one of its purposes is “to reinstate original congressional intent regarding the
definition of disability” and proceeds to demarcate a broader scope of disability than that
propounded by the federal judiciary. ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. §
2(3) (2007).
376. H.R. 3195 § 5.
377. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2007).
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such discrimination.378 The current language—“against a qualified individual with a
disability”—does not provide this presumption.379 This change would restore the social
conception of disability and reject the judiciary’s rigidly biomedical approach by
restoring the focus to simply disability discrimination.380
Second, the ADA Restoration Act proposes that the definition for actual disability
be shortened from “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual” to simply “a physical or mental
impairment.”381 Distilling this language would solve the problems that relate to the
court’s current emphasis on functionality and whether an individual is so disabled that
she is “substantially limited.”382 As noted above, the “physical or mental impairment”
language by itself has rarely been used to exclude plaintiffs in ADA case law;383
rather, it is the technical analysis under “substantially limits” and “major life
activities” that has left plaintiffs without a remedy.384 Moreover, whereas mental and
physical impairment are currently undefined within the text of the ADA, the ADA
Restoration Act provides definitions for mental and physical impairment that are
extremely broad.385 The upshot is that under this Act, virtually all perceived
disabilities would qualify for protection under the ADA. Simplifying the definition for
disability would also harmonize with one of the proposed changes in construction: that
the provisions of the ADA be “broadly construed to advance their remedial
purpose.”386 This construction would explicitly contravene the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams that eligibility for the
ADA’s protection should be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled.”387

378. Press Release, U.S.H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner/Hoyer Introduce
Bipartisan Legislation Restoring Americans with Disabilities Act Protections (Sept. 29, 2006),
http://judiciary.house.gov/ media/pdfs/ADAbillintro92906.pdf.
379. Id.
380. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 11, 102. The ADA Restoration Act advances a
broad, social model of disability by clarifying that ADA protection should be available to
ameliorate:
adverse treatment based on actual or perceived impairment, or record of
impairment, . . . prejudic[ial] attitudes, such as myths, fears, ignorance, or
stereotypes concerning disability or particular disabilities, . . . failure to remove
societal and institutional barriers, including communication, transportation, and
architectural barriers, and the failure to provide reasonable modifications to
policies, practices, and procedures, reasonable accommodations, and auxiliary aids
and services.
ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (2007).
381. H.R. 3195 § 4.
382. See supra Part I.C.
383. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part I.C.
385. H.R. 3195 § 4(3)–(4). “Physical or mental impairment” is presently defined in the
ADA’s regulations. Id. However, given the lack of deference that has been given to regulations
issued by the EEOC, including definitions in the text of the statute would leave less room for
judicial interpretation.
386. Id. at § 7.
387. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); see also H.R. 3195 § 2(a)(7) (noting in its findings that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams was averse to “congressional expectations that disability

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=980177

2008]

WHEN DISABILITY ISN’T “JUST RIGHT”

229

Third, the ADA Restoration Act states as another rule of construction that whether
an individual has a physical or mental impairment should be determined without
regard to an individual’s use of mitigating measures or whether the impairment is
episodic, in remission, or latent.388 This would solve the dilemmas discussed above in
the Section on mitigation 389 by invalidating the court’s rulings in Albertson’s v.
Kirkingburg,390 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,391 and Sutton v. United Airlines.392
This portion of the Act would also nullify the question of how long a disability must
last to qualify one for the ADA’s protections.
The ADA Restoration Act would generally eliminate a plaintiff’s need to present
scads of evidence demonstrating just how disabled she is. A plaintiff would no longer
have to collect and present the type of evidence that employers have often used to
argue the plaintiff was “too disabled” and not “qualified” for the job.
The recently proposed ADA Restoration Act did not incorporate all of the
National Council on Disability’s recommendations. At least one of its
recommendations merits reconsideration by Congress. In particular, committees
reviewing the ADA Restoration Act should consider incorporating language that
conceptualizes disability on a continuum. The National Council on Disability has
recommended the following language be included among Congress’s findings:
though variation in people’s abilities and disabilities across a broad spectrum is a
normal part of the human condition, some individuals have been singled out and
subjected to discrimination because they have conditions considered disabilities by
others; other individuals have been excluded or disadvantaged because their
physical or mental impairments have been ignored in the planning and
construction of facilities, vehicles, and services; and all Americans run the risk of
being discriminated against because they are misperceived as having conditions
they may not actually have or because of misperceptions about the limitations
resulting from conditions they do have.393

These statements explain that disability is more about a label than an acute deficiency.
In fact, all people naturally have certain types and degrees of proficiencies and
deficiencies. Some simply receive the label of disability.394
B. Broadening the Scope of Disability
The big picture change of the ADA Restoration Act would be to broaden the scope
of disability and increase the number of those eligible for protection under the ADA.
Though some might worry that this change would precipitate a flood of litigation,
would be interpreted broadly”).
388. See H.R. 3195 § 4(2)(B)(i). Congress also explicitly states as one of its findings that,
according to ADA committee reports, the use of mitigating measures should not eliminate
anyone from the Act’s coverage. Id. at § 2(a)(8).
389. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
390. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
391. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
392. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
393. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 10, at 19.
394. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing how under this “continuum”
conception of disability, the population is not capable of neat dissection into groups of disabled
and non-disabled).
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Justice Stevens anticipated just such a concern in his dissent in Sutton and responded
with two arguments.
First, Justice Stevens argued that requirements similar to United’s eyesight
requirement are unlikely to have justifiable application in most industries.395 In other
words, it is difficult to envision many situations in which a qualified employee who
needs glasses to perform her job might not be hired or fired because of the fact she
cannot see well without them. For example, imagine if an accounting firm adopted a
guideline refusing to hire any incoming accountant whose uncorrected vision did not
meet a certain standard—or by the same logic, the firm refused to hire any person who
was unable to avoid seizures without medication.396 Such a rule would reek of
invidious discrimination. Thus, allowing plaintiffs to challenge such rules by proving
they are qualified in their mitigated state does not appear it would clog the dockets of
federal courts. Besides, many of these cases are already likely brought and lost. A
change, though, could curb such losses.
Second, providing an expansive definition of who qualifies for statutory protection
generally does not give anyone an undue advantage.397 As explained above, a broad
approach to interpreting disability under the ADA accords with the treatment of civil
rights under other major statutes. In his dissent, Justice Stevens observed that allowing
those with poor eyesight or other correctable impairments to file lawsuits claiming
disability discrimination, without having to fight a battle over whether they fit within
the protected class, would be nothing foreign to civil rights jurisprudence.398 The same
individuals already may file presumptively valid employment discrimination claims on
the basis of their race, sex, religion, color, and national origin.399 Justice Stevens
concluded that “it is hard to believe that providing individuals with one more
antidiscrimination protection will make any more of them file baseless or vexatious
lawsuits.”400
This same logic also applies to the more general broadening of disability advanced
in the ADA Restoration Act. Why should it be much more difficult to have standing
under the ADA, than under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?
In any such case, the plaintiff still must prove they were qualified and that
discrimination on the basis of a protected trait was the reason for an adverse
employment decision. Moreover, in a case under the ADA seeking accommodation,
the plaintiff would need to show her request was reasonable and would not cause the
employer undue hardship.
Finally, a narrow definition of disability is without the support of the ADA’s
legislative history.401 Indeed, both proponents and opponents of the ADA understood
the definition of disability to have a very broad scope.402 To be sure, there were
attempts to limit the definition of disability—for example, by excluding individuals
with contagious diseases or a history of drug abuse—but none of these attempts

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 510 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
O’BRIEN, supra note 41, at 17.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
COLKER, supra note 84, at 65.
Id.
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succeeded.403 Though there were compromises to get the ADA passed, the definition
of disability itself was not a source of compromise.404
The changes proposed in the ADA Restoration Act, if enacted, would ultimately
mean that many more cases survive summary judgment. Though it is impossible to
predict how much more success would be realized by surviving summary judgment—
Ruth Colker has recently examined how statistics regarding ADA wins and losses are
somewhat misleading 405—disabled plaintiffs would undoubtedly fare better. The ADA
Restoration Act would treat disability more like protected categories under Title VII,
where it is not usually necessary to prove one “qualifies” under the statute’s protected
classes. The presumption would shift from “not disabled” to “disabled” and from a
“protected class” mentality to an “antidiscrimination” mentality.
C. Educating the Public and the Judiciary
Over the last two decades, disability has been a category rife with misunderstanding
and misperceptions. Moreover, the general “notion that there has been some systematic
. . . social practice of discriminating against the disabled will strike most people as
simply untrue.”406 Accordingly, the EEOC should be charged with helping reverse
some of these misperceptions. The EEOC should be assigned the task of developing
reports as to certain disabilities that have been the distinct target of discriminating
employers. Sharona Hoffman has recommended such a course of action—albeit for a
slightly different purpose.407 She supports the creation of such reports to compile a list
of non-exclusive and presumptive, or “per se,” disabilities under the ADA.408 Of
course, the ADA Restoration Act would obviate the need for any presumptive
disabilities. With the definition for actual disability shortened to simply “a physical or
mental impairment,” virtually all perceived disabilities would qualify for protection
under the ADA.
Notwithstanding her difference in purpose, she recommends the EEOC consult a
variety of data sources to gather this evidence.409 First, it should turn to historical
records. It is well known that certain disabled groups have historically been targeted
and subjected to extreme discrimination.410 At times, this has been as subtle as the
architectural and communication barriers certain groups—such as the blind or
paralyzed—face.411 At other times, this has been as explicit as state eugenics laws.412
Where historical data is not available, the EEOC could utilize census data, polls, and

403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Professor Colker has explained in part that “[w]in-loss data are affected by settlement
decisions. Successful settlement outcomes are beneficial to plaintiffs but are not counted in
judicial outcome statistics.” COLKER, supra note 84, at 71–72; see also Hoffman, supra note
251, at 1244–47 (explaining why it is difficult to evaluate the statistical extent to which the
ADA is providing relief to those who experience disability discrimination).
406. Stein, supra note 22, at 604.
407. Hoffman, supra note 251, at 1251–58.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 1253.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1253–54.
412. Id. at 1253.
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other studies to supplement gaps in knowledge.413 Some of this information could be
compiled through external research, while some could be initiated internally by the
EEOC. These very types of sources have provided support in the past for the passage
of anti-discrimination legislation.414 The EEOC should also examine its own records of
discrimination charges,415 which would complement these other sources in its efforts
to educate.
The aforementioned sources of information could be utilized to generate reports
chronicling the types of disability discrimination that have been pronounced or
prevalent over the years. EEOC reports should be made available to the public and the
judiciary, and drafted from the perspective that disability is largely a label—a social
construction—people assign certain groups based on perceived differences. The goal
of these reports would be to educate the public and judiciary concerning patterns and
trends of disability discrimination. Though most of the public may not read these
reports, it is likely they would be written about and presented by attorneys to the
judiciary. Over time, the content of such reports would likely “trickle down” to the
public as findings in these reports became mainstream knowledge.
CONCLUSION
The medical model of disability has been ubiquitous, with the public and judiciary
continually reinforcing its underlying presuppositions. In popular culture, the result
has been misperceptions, false stereotypes, and ultimately condescension. In the
judiciary, the result has been that most lawsuits brought under Title I of the ADA are
simply dismissed at summary judgment.
While there are no perfect solutions, it is important to illuminate some of the
subtle—and sometimes not so subtle—messages that are sent regarding the meaning of
disability. Taking the time to examine these inputs is the first step in changing
people’s perceptions of disability. It is also essential to articulate a reasonable,
practical solution to some of the current judicial dilemmas faced by those with
disabilities. Though the opening comparisons to Goldilocks may seem lighthearted,
this allusion reveals the grave reality that disabled plaintiffs are often leaving the
courthouse having been told they were not disabled “just right” to qualify for the
ADA’s protections. This must be confusing for those who see the ADA as their only
recourse.
The ADA Restoration Act—bipartisan and recently re-introduced in the
legislature—would restore much of the original, social model-based intent to the ADA
and allow disabled plaintiffs to avoid debate as to whether they are disabled enough to
utilize the ADA’s protections. For these plaintiffs, they would likely be disabled “just
right,” enabling them to reach fundamental issues of discrimination and
accommodation.

413. Id. at 1255.
414. Id.
415. Id.
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